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THE NEW PROPERTY
CHARLES A. REICH*
THE institution called property guards the troubled boundary between in-
dividual man and the state. It is not the only guardian; many other institutions,
laws, and practices serve as well. But in a society that chiefly values material
well-being, the power to control a particular portion of that well-being is the
very foundation of individuality.
One of the most important developments in the United States during the
past decade has been the emergence of government as a major source of
wealth. Government is a gigantic syphon. It draws in revenue and power,
and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises, and
licenses. Government has always had this function. But while in early times
it was minor, today's distribution of largess is on a vast, imperial scale.
The valuables dispensed by government take many forms, but they all share
one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of
wealth - forms which are held as private property. Social insurance substi-
tutes for savings; a government contract replaces a businessman's customers
and goodwill. The wealth of more and more Americans depends upon a rela-
tionship to government. Increasingly, Americans live on government largess
- allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients subject
to conditions which express "the public interest."
The growth of government largess, accompanied by a distinctive system
of law, is having profound consequences. It affects the underpinnings of in-
dividualism and independence. It influences the workings of the Bill of Rights.
It has an impact on the power of private interests, in their relation to each
other and to government. It is helping to create a new society.
This article is an attempt to explore these changes. It begins with an ex-
amination of the nature of government largess. Second, it reviews the system
of law, substantive and procedural, that has emerged. Third, it examines some
of the consequences, to the individual, to private interests, and to society.
Fourth, it considers the functions of property and their relationship to "the
public interest." Finally, it turns to the future of individualism in the new
society that is coming. The object is to present an overview - a way of looking
at many seemingly unrelated problems. Inevitably, such an effort must be
incomplete and tentative. But it is long past time that we began looking at
the transformation taking place around us.
*Associate Professor of Law, Yale niversity.
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I. THE LARGESS OF GOVERNMIENT
A. The Forms of Government-Created Wealth
The valuables which derive from relationships to government are of many
kinds. Some primarily concern individuals; others flow to businesses and
organizations. Some are obvious forms of wealth, such as direct payments of
money, while others, like licenses and franchises, are indirectly valuable.
Income and benefits. For a large number of people, government is a direct
source of income although they hold no public job. Their eligibility arises
from legal status. Examples are Social Security benefits, unemployment com-
pensation, aid to dependent children, veterans benefits, and the whole scheme
of state and local welfare. These represent a principal source of income to a
substantial segment of the community. Total federal, state, and local social
welfare expenditures in 1961 were almost fifty-eight billion dollars.'
Jobs. More than nine million persons receive income from public funds
because they are directly employed by federal, state, or local government.2 The
size of the publicly employed working force has increased steadily since the
founding of the United States, and seems likely to keep on increasing. If the
three to four million persons employed in defense industries, 3 which exist
mainly on government funds, are added to the nine million directly employed,
it may be estimated that fifteen to twenty percent of the labor force receives
its primary income from government. 4
Occupational licenses. Licenses are required before one may engage in
many kinds of work, from practicing medicine to guiding hunters through
the woods. 5 Even occupations which require little education or training, like
that of longshoremen, often are subject to strict licensing.6 Such licenses,
which are dispensed by government, make it possible for their holders to re-
ceive what is ordinarily their chief source of income.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 283,
Table 374 (1963).
2. Id. at 435, Table 567.
3. In, 1961 it was estimated that up to 7,500,000 Americans were employed by defense.
This is 10% of the entire labor force, and supports between 19,500,000 and 22,500,000
people. Four million comprise the non-governmental working force, and 3,500,000 work
directly for the Defense Department. Its payroll is more than, twice the payroll of the
entire automobile industry. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1961, p. 48, col. 1.
4. The total number of the employed civilian labor force in, March, 1963 was esti-
mated to be 67,148,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 219, table 286.
5. See generally GELL.ORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS
105-51 (1956) ; CouNcIl OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION
IN TEE STATES (1952). Typical statutes are: Wyo. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 55 (1957)
(guides); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5615-81 (landscape architects), 6500-6625 (bar-
bers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 281.1-81.32 (pawnbrokers), 471-79.20 (funeral direc-
tors) (1959).
See also Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in
California, 14 STAN. L. RZv. 533 (1962).
6. N.J. STAT. ANN., Waterfront Commission, Act, tit. 32, ch. 23, §§ 19-24 (steve-
dores), §§ 27-28 (longshoremen) (1953). See N.Y. Times, April 10, 1962, p. 86, cols. 7-8.
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Franchises. A franchise, which may be held by an individual or by a com-
pany, is a partial monopoly created and handed out by government. Its value
depends largely upon governmental power; by limiting the number of fran-
chises, government can make them extremely remunerative. A New York
City taxi medallion, which costs very little when originally obtained from the
city, can be sold for over twenty thousand dollars. 7 The reason for this high
price is that the city has not issued new transferable medallions despite the
rise in population and traffic. A television channel, handed out free, can often
be sold for many millions. Government distributes wealth when it dispenses
route permits to truckers, charters to bus lines, routes to air carriers, certifi-
cates to oil and gas pipelines, licenses to liquor stores, allotments to growers of
cotton or wheat, and concessions in national parks.8
Contracts. Many individuals and many more businesses enjoy public gener-
osity in the form of government contracts. Fifty billion dollars annually flows
from the federal government in the form of defense spending." These contracts
often resemble subsidies; it is virtually impossible to lose money on them.
Businesses sometimes make the government their principal source of income,
and many "free enterprises" are set up primarily to do business with the
government."0
Subsidies. Analogous to welfare payments for individuals who cannot man-
age independently in the economy are subsidies to business." Agriculture is
7. A New York Taxi Medallion is a piece of tin worth 300 times its weight in gold.
No new transferable medallions have been issued since 1937. Their value in 1961 was
estimated at $21,000 to $23,000; banks will lend up to $13,000 on one. The cabbie pays the
City only $200 a year for his medallion. There is a brisk trade in them: out of 11,800,
about 600 changed hands in 1961. One company, National Transportation Co., sold 100
medallions at $21,000 each, a transaction totaling $2,100,000. A non-transferable license,
of which there are a few, has no market value. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 46, col. 3.
8. Even the right to locate juke boxes may be a valuable franchise if the law limits
the right, as in the City of Seattle. Ragan v. City of Seattle, 58 Wash. 2d 779, 364 P2d
916 (1961).
9. In January, 1962 it was estimated that the nation's annual defense expenditures
would rise in that year to a plateau of $50,000,000. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 81, col. 2.
$49.7 billion was asked for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1962. N.Y. Times, April 29,
1962, § 3, p. 1, cols. 5-6. Defense procurement is governed generally by 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
14 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 06, 10-11 (Supp. IV, 1962); 10 U.S.C. §§
2352-57 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2358 (Supp. IV, 1962). See generally PECK &
SCHERER, THE WE.&Aoxs AcQuIsrrIoN PROcEss: AN EcoN oMIc ANALYsis (1962).
10. In the waning weeks of 1961, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion handed out a series of huge holiday presents. They were contracts concerned with
the nation's effort to put a three man expedition on the moon....
The total of all the recently announced contracts is about $1,000,000,000 .... It was
estimated that by 1964 space exploration, expenditures would reach a plateau of five billion
dollars annually.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 118, cols. 1, 3.
11. See generally JoINlT EcoNoMInc COMMITTEE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUBSMY AND
SUrsnIYLmIK PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1960); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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subsidized to help it survive against better organized (and less competitive)
sectors of the economy, and the shipping industry is given a dole because of
its inability to compete with foreign lines.12 Local airlines are also on the dole.1 3
So are other major industries, notably housing. Still others, such as the rail-
roads, are eagerly seeking help.' 4 Government also supports many non-business
activities, in such areas as scientific research, health, and education. Total
federal subsidies for 1964 were expected to be just under eight and a half
billion dollars.' 5
Use of public resources. A very large part of the American economy is
publicly owned. Government owns or controls hundreds of millions of acres
of public lands valuable for mining, grazing, lumbering, and recreation; sources
of energy such as the hydroelectric power of all major 'rivers, the tidelands
reservoirs of oil, and the infant giant of nuclear power; routes of travel and
commerce such as the airways, highways, and rivers; the radio-television
spectrum which is the avenue for all broadcasting; hoards of surplus crops
and materials; public buildings and facilities; and much more. These resources
are available for utilization by private businesses and individuals; such use
is often equivalent to a subsidy. The radio-television industry uses the scarce
channels of the air, free of charge; electric companies use publicly-owned
water power ;16 stockmen graze sheep and cattle on public lands at nominal
cost ;17 ships and airplanes arrive and depart from publicly-owned docks and
airports; the atomic energy industry uses government materials, facilities,
and know-how, and all are entitled to make a profit.
Services. Like resources, government services are a source of wealth. Some
of these are plainly of commercial value: postal service for periodicals, news-
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 86TH CoNG., 2D SEss., GOvERNMENT SuBsIDY HISTORICAL
REVmw (1960).
The sugar subsidy is one illustration. See 61 Stat. 922 (1948), as amended, 65 Stat.
318 (1951) ; 70 Stat. 217 (1956) ; 74 Stat. 330 (1960) ; 75 Stat. 40 (1961) ; 76 Stat. 156
(1962) ; 76 Stat. 169 (1962).
12. Maritime subsidies amounted to $300,000,000 in 1962, according to Rep. H. C.
Bonner, Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1962, p. 61M, col. 2. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294. See also U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 394, table 517. It was recently disclosed that the
U.S. would pay a subsidy of $14.55 a ton for cargo shipments to and from the Far East.
Per ton rates vary from $25 to $33. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1963, p. 82, col. 6. During this
same period, Secretary McNamara asserted that there was no military reason for gov-
ernment-subsidized construction of passenger ships. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1962, p. 62,
col. 1.
13. 49 U.S.C. § 1324 note (1958); 49 U.S.C. § 1380 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1380 (Supp. IV, 1962).
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1963, p. 39, col. 5 (on the needs of the New Haven
Railroad).
15. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 394, table 517.
16. Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828
(1958).
17. Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1958), as amended,
43 U.S.C, § 315 (Supp. IV, 1962).
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papers, advertisers, and mail-order houses; insurance for home builders and
savings banks; technical information for agriculture. Other services dispensed
by government include sewage, sanitation, police and fire protection, and public
transportation. The Communications Satellite represents an unusual type of
subsidy through service: the turning over of government research and know-
how to a quasi-private organization.' 8 The most important public service of
all, education, is one of the greatest sources of value to the individual.
B. The Importance of Government Largess
How important is governmentally dispensed wealth in relation to the total
economic life of the nation? In 1961, when personal income totalled $416,432,-
000,000,19 governmental expenditures on all levels amounted to $164,875,-
000,000.20 The governmental payroll alone approached forty-five billion dol-
lars.21 And these figures do not take account of the vast intangible wealth
represented by licenses, franchises, services, and resources. Moreover, the
proportion of governmental wealth is increasing. Hardly any citizen leads his
life without at least partial dependence on wealth flowing through the giant
government syphon.
In many cases, this dependence is not voluntary. Valuables that flow from
government are often substitutes for, rather than supplements to, other forms
of wealth. Social Security and other forms of public insurance and compen-
sation are supported by taxes. This tax money is no longer available for in-
dividual savings or insurance. The taxpayer is a participant in public insurance
by compulsion, and his ability to care for his own needs independently is cor-
respondingly reduced. Similarly, there is no choice about using public trans-
portation, public lands for recreation, public airport terminals, or public
insurance on savings deposits. In these and countless other areas, government
is the sole supplier. Moreover, the increasing dominance of scientific tech-
nology, so largely a product of government research and development, generates
an even greater dependence on government.
22
Dependence creates a vicious circle of dependence. It is as hard for a business
to give up government help as it is for an individual to live on a reduced in-
come. And when one sector of the economy is subsidized, others are forced
to seek comparable participation. This is true of geographical areas; govern-
ment contracts can fundamentally influence the economy of a region.23 It is
18. Communications Satellite Act, 76 Stat. 419 (1962). See Editorial, The Space
Communications Satellite, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1962, p. 32, col. 1.
19. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 328, table 439.
20. Id. at 417, table 546.
21. Id. at 434, table 564.
22. See generally STOVER, THE GOVERNMENT OF ScIENCE (Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, 1962). The vast scope of the government's research and develop-
ment program is described by Lawrence Gallon in Will Space Research Pay Off on
Earth, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1963, § 6 (Magazine), p. 29. He estimates government re-
search expenditures of 15 billion dollars in Fiscal 1964.
23. The profound effect of research and developments contracts on the relative eco-
nomic position of various regions of the country is described by James Reston, in The
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
also true of different components of the economy. If one form of transpor-
tation is subsidized, other types of transportation may be compelled to seek
subsidies.24 When some occupations are subsidized, others, which help to
pay the bill, find themselves disadvantaged as a class. Thus, it is not strange
to find musicians seeking a subsidy - perhaps to pay food bills that are made
artificially high because of another subsidy.25 Nor is it strange to find that
an unemployed worker replaced by a machine seeks government funds to re-
train, when in many cases the machine was created through government sub-
sidized research and development. And it is not surprising that subsidies may
be needed to enable workers to live in our large cities ;26 they must buy necessi-
ties at prices inflated to meet others' subsidized ability to pay.
The prospect is that government largess will necessarily assume ever greater
importance as we move closer to a welfare state. Such a state, whatever its
particular form, undertakes responsibility for the well-being of those citizens
who, because of circumstances beyond their control, cannot provide minimum
care, education, housing, or subsistence for themselves. This responsibility
can only be carried out by means of what we have defined as government
largess.
C. Largess and the Changing Forms of Wealth
The significance of government largess is increased by certain underlying
changes in the forms of private wealth in the United States. Changes in the
forms of wealth are not remarkable in themselves; the forms are constantly
changing and differ in every culture. But today more and more of our wealth
takes the form of rights or status rather than of tangible goods. An individual's
profession or occupation is a prime example. To many others, a job with a
particular employer is the principal form of wealth. A profession or a job is
frequently far more valuable than a house or bank account, for a new house
can.be bought, and a new bank account created, once a profession or job is
secure. For the jobless, their status as governmentally assisted or insured per-
sons may be the main source of subsistence.
The automobile dealer's chief wealth is his franchise from the manufacturer
which gives him exclusive sales rights within a certain territory, for it is his
Scientific Revolution in America, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1962, p. 30, col. 3. See also U.S.
Aids Midwest in Arms Job Race, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1962, § 1A, p. 80, col. 3; Dyna-
Soar Loss Shocks Seattle, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1963, p. 38, cols. 3-8; Space Funds Stir
Political Storm, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1964, p. 1, col. 3 ("The regional competition for
the research and development dollars, which in many ways have become the modern-day
'pork barrel' for Congressmen, undoubtedly will intensify in the years ahead." P. 60, col.3).
24. Greater transportation subsidies will soon be needed. See Text of President's
Message to Congress on Nation's Transportation Problems, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1962,
pp. 18-19. In 1962, by way of illustration, Eastern Airlines sought a 23.8 million dollar
subsidy. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1962, p. 41, col. 5.
25. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1961, § 2, p. 1, col. 1.
26. Subsidies have been proposed for low and middle income apartment tenants in
New York City. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1962, § 8, p. 1, col. 8.
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guarantee of income. His building, his stock of cars, his organization, and his
goodwill may all be less valuable than his franchise. Franchises represent the
principal asset of many businesses: the gasoline station, chain restaurant,
motel or drug store, and many other retail suppliers.27 To the large manufac-
turer, contracts, business arrangements, and organization may be the most
valuable assets. The steel company's relationships with coal and iron producers
and automobile manufacturers and construction companies may be worth
more than all its plant and equipment.
The kinds of wealth dispensed by government consist almost entirely of
those forms which are in the ascendancy today. To the individual, these new
forms, such as a profession, job, or right to receive income, are the basis of his
various statuses in society, and may therefore be the most meaningful and dis-
tinctive wealth he possesses.28
I. THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF LAW
Wealth or value is created by culture and by society; it is culture that
makes a diamond valuable and a pebble worthless. Property, on the other
hand, is the creation of law. A man who has property has certain legal rights
with respect to an item of wealth; property represents a relationship between
wealth and its "owner." Government largess is plainly "wealth," but it is not
necessarily "property."
Government largess has given rise to a distinctive system of law. This
system can be viewed from at least three perspectives; the rights of holders
of largess, the powers of government over largess, and the procedure by which
holders' rights and governmental power are adjusted. At this point, analysis
will not be aided by attempting to apply or to reject the label "property."
What is important is to survey - without the use of labels - the unique
legal system that is emerging.
A. Individual Rights In Largess
As government largess has grown in importance, quite naturally there has
been pressure for the protection of individual interests in it. The holder of
a broadcast license or a motor carrier permit or a grazing permit for the
public lands tends to consider this wealth his "own," and to seek legal pro-
tection against interference with his enjoyment. The development of indi-
vidual interests has been substantial, but it has not come easily.
From the beginning, individual rights in largess have been greatly affected
by several traditional legal concepts, each of which has had lasting significance:
27. For a report on the growth of investment in private franchises, see N.Y. Times,
Oct. 6, 1963, § 3, p. 1, col. 3.
28. A story in the New York Times reports the plight of Stanley P. Truchlinsky, a
one-armed newsdealer who lost his 26-year job at a kiosk opposite Carnegie Hall
because he could not retain a license to operate the stand. Attempting to overcome his
bitterness, Mr. Truchlinsky said he would take an aptitude test to see "what I can do."
N.Y. Times, March 11, 1964, p. 34, col. 2.
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Right vs. privilege. The early law is marked by courts' attempts to distinguish
which forms of largess were "rights" and which were "privileges." Legal
protection of the former was by far the greater. If the holder of a license had
a "right," he might be entitled to a hearing before the license could be re-
voked; a "mere privilege" might be revoked without notice or hearing.2
The gratuity principle. Government largess has often been considered a
"gratuity" furnished by the state.30 Hence it is said that the state can withhold,
grant, or revoke the largess at its pleasure.3' Under this theory, government
is considered to be in somewhat the same position as a private giver.
The whole and the parts. Related to the gratuity theory is the idea that,
since government may completely withhold a benefit, it may grant it subject
to any terms or conditions whatever. This theory is essentially an exercise
in logic: the whole power must include all of its parts.3 2
Internal management. Particularly in relation to its own contracts, govern-
ment has been permitted extensive power on the theory that it should have
control over its own housekeeping or internal management functions. Under
this theory, government is treated like a private business. In its dealings with
outsiders it is permitted much of the freedom to grant contracts and licenses
that a private business would have.33
Quite often these four theories are blurred in a single statement of judicial
attitude. The following illustrations are typical:
It is an elementary rule of law that the right to operate a motor vehicle
upon a public street or highway is not a natural or unrestrained right,
but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulation under the police
power of the state in the interest of public safety and welfare.
34
A taxicab is a common carrier and use by it of the public streets is
not a right but a privilege or license which can be granted on such con-
ditions as the Legislature may impose.35
The practice of medicine is lawfully prohibited by the State except
upon the conditions it imposes. Such practice is a privilege granted by
29. See generally GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 105-51.
30. For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared that veterans'
disability benefits "fall within the legal principles respecting gratuities." Thompson v.
Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 906 (1962).
31. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934).
32. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1609 (1960),
which rejects the theory and states that the imposition of such conditions is "a distinct
exercise of power which must find its own justification."
33. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940):
Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted
power to produce its own, supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal,
and to fix the terms and conditions upon, which it will make needed purchases.
34. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 570, 358 P.2d 765 (1961).
35. Stewart v. District of Columbia, 35 A-2d 247, 248 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1943).
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the State under its substantially plenary power to fix the terms of ad-
mission.3 6
One court put the idea in somewhat more pithy form: "... in accepting
charity, the appellant has consented to the provisions of the law under which
the charity is bestowed." 37
These sentiments are often voiced in the law of government largess, but
individual interests have grown up nevertheless. The most common forms of
protection are procedural, coupled with an insistence that government action
be based on standards that are not "arbitrary" or unauthorized. Development
has varied mainly according to the particular type of wealth involved. The
courts have most readily granted protection to those types which are inti-
mately bound up with the individual's freedom to earn a living. They have
been reluctant to grant individual rights in those types of largess which seem
to be exercises of the managerial functions of government, such as subsidies
and government contracts.
Occupational licenses. After some initial hesitation, courts have generally
held that an occupational or professional license may not be denied or revoked
without affording the applicant notice and a hearing.38 Doctors, lawyers, real
estate brokers, and taxi drivers may not be denied their livelihood without
some minimum procedure.3 9 In addition to requiring notice and hearing, some
courts may also review the evidence for sufficiency, to see if a basis for the
official action exists in fact.40 The need for procedural protection for occupa-
tional licenses is sufficiently well accepted that hearings have been required
on denial of security clearances when these are tantamount to occupational
licenses.4 1
Drivcrs' licenses. Licenses not specifically tied to a particular occupation,
such as drivers' licenses, have to some extent been assimilated under the um-
brella of occupational licenses. New York's highest court declared that a
driver's license is "of tremendous value to the individual and may not be taken
36. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954).
37. Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
38. E.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
39. See, e.g., Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461 (1954). See generally Kneier,
Licensing by Local Goveronents in Illinois, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 1 (1957) ; Note, Entrance
and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. R~v.
533 (1962).
40. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ; Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962). In the
Schware case the Court said:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . A state can require high
standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in, its law,
before it admfts an applicant to its bar, but any qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.
353 U.S. at 238-39.
41. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Graham v. Richmond, 272 F.2d
517 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
1964]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
away except by due process. '42 Another court treated a driver's license not
as an economic right but as an aspect of personal liberty:
Therefore it is unimportant whether, for one purpose or another, a
license to operate motor vehicles may properly be described as a mere
personal privilege rather than as a property right. We have no doubt
that the freedom to make use of one's own property, here a motor vehicle,
as a means of getting about from place to place, whether in pursuit of
business or pleasure, is a "liberty" which under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment cannot be denied or curtailed by a state without due process of law.43
Franchises. A franchise is less of a "natural right" than an occupational
license, because it confers an exclusive or monopoly position established by
government. But the courts early took the position that certain types of fran-
chises were "property" protected by the Constitution.44 And even air route
certificates, which are clearly not like the old-time franchise, are given judicial
protection. The courts recognize the existence of "business and investment
property" which must be protected.45 Arguing that Congress intended an air
carrier to enjoy "security of route," the Supreme Court has insisted on pro-
cedural safeguards before modification of a route.46
Benefits. With somewhat greater reluctance, the courts have moved toward
a measure of legal protection for benefits. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals rejected an argument that a Veterans Administration decision (im-
posing a forfeiture of benefits because the veteran had rendered assistance to
an enemy) is not reviewable by the courts 4 The same court also questioned
whether Congress could authorize an adn'iinistrator to revoke a veteran's dis-
ability pension without some standards to guide him.48 And the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a state cannot deny unemployment benefits on grounds which
interfere with freedom of religion.49 In California, the courts held that un-
employment compensation may not be denied one who refuses a job because
he feels unable to take a required loyalty oath. 50
42. Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 441, 103 N.Ef2d 728, 731 (1952). See also
Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
43. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1953).
44. City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58 (1913); Frost
v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); Seatrain Lines v. United States, 64
F. Supp. 156 (D. Del. 1946).
45. Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 294 F2d 217, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1961). On the
procedures required for modifying an air carrier's certificate, see CAB v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 331-32 (1961).
46. CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961). The trend toward judicial
protection of franchises is further illustrated by a Fifth Circuit decision that arbitrary
denial of a liquor license gives rise to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
47. Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 354 U.S. 931 (1959).
48. Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d, 901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
49. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. Syrek v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 2 Cal. Rptr. 40, 47 (1960),
aff'd, 54 Cal. 2d 519, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97, 354 P.2d 625 (1960). See also Ault Unemployment
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Sudsidies. A subsidy to a business is like a benefit to an individual, but
the concept of "rights" in a subsidy is somewhat more attenuated. However,
when the Postmaster General found the contents of Esquire Magazine to be
objectionable, the Supreme Court made a strong stand for protection of the
second class mail subsidy against arbitrary withdrawal. 51 And another court
held that a condition attached by the Maritime Board to a subsidy could be
attacked by the company which accepted the condition on the ground that it
was illegally retroactive and discriminatory.52
Use of public resources. Although it is frequently stated that there are
no property rights in public resources, the courts have afforded a measure of
protection. They have given the holder of a grazing permit the right to prevent
interference by others.53 And the California Supreme Court has held that
the use of a public school auditorium cannot be denied to a group because
it refuses to sign a loyalty oath. The court said: "The state is under no duty
to make school buildings available for public meetings. . . .If it elects to do
so, however, it cannot arbitrarily prevent any members of the public from
holding such meetings. .. .
Contracts. Government contracts might seem the best possible example of
a type of valuable which no one has any right to receive, and which represents
only the government's managerial function. But even here, at least one court
has said that a would-be contractor may not be wholly debarred from eligi-
bility as a consequence of arbitrary government action:
While they do not have a right to contract with the United States on
their own terms, appellants do have a right not to be invalidly denied
equal opportunity under applicable law to seek contracts on government
projects. 55
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that sellers of petroleum
stated a valid cause of action when they charged that the government was in-
Compensation Case, 398 Pa. 250, 157 A.2d 375 (1960); Darin Unemployment Compen-
sation Case, 398 Pa. 259, 157 A.2d 407 (1960) ; Fino v. Maryland Employment Security
Bd., 218 Md. 504, 147 A.2d 738 (1958); but see Ostrofsky v. Maryland Employment
Security Bd., 218 Md. 509, 147 A2d 741 (1958).
51. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
52. American President Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 291 F.2d 931, 936 (Ct. CI. 1961):
The administration of a statute cannot be carried on like horse-trading or haggling
in a market place for private trading. What one can be induced to agree to, after
he hag become deeply involved with the Government by several years of action
based upon reasonable assumptions, cannot impair his right under the statute to
non-discriminatory treatment, and freedom from unreasonably retroactive treat-
ment.
53. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949). The court indicated that
it would protect rights as between private parties even though the government could
revoke the permit at any time. Id. at 742.
54. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545, 171 P.2d 885
(1946). See also ACLU v. Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 2d 167, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d
45 (1961).
55. Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F2d 368, 370-71 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
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sisting without authority that it would purchase oil only from companies
agreeing to abide by its "Voluntary Oil Import Program." 6 In New York a
state Supreme Court justice overruled an action by the City Board of Educa-
tion barring two contractors from doing business with the Board in the future.
The court called the action arbitrary and capricious.5 7
In all of the cases concerning individual rights in largess the exact nature
of the government action which precipitates the controversy makes a great
difference. A controversy over government largess may arise from such di-
verse situations as denial of the right to apply, denial of an application, attach-
ing of conditions to a grant, modification of a grant already made, suspension
or revocation of a grant, or some other sanction. In general, courts tend to
afford the greatest measure of protection in revocation or suspension cases.
The theory seems to be that here some sort of rights have "vested" which
may not be taken away without proper procedure. On the other hand, an ap-
plicant for largess is thought to have less at stake, and is therefore entitled
to less protection58 The mere fact that a particular form of largess is protected
in one context does not mean that it will be protected in all others.
While individual interests in largess have developed along the lines of pro-
cedural protection and restraint upon arbitrary official action, substantive
rights to possess and use largess have remained very limited. In the first place,
largess does not "vest" in a recipient; it almost always remains revocable. For
example:
The policy of the [Communications] Act is clear that no person is to
have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting
of a license. Licenses are limited to a maximum of three years' duration,
may be revoked, and need not be renewed. 59
Likewise, veterans' disability benefits are by statute made subject to forfeiture:
Any person shown by evidence satisfactory to the Administrator to be
guilty of mutiny, treason, sabotage, or rendering assistance to any enemy
of the United States or of its allies shall forfeit all accrued or future bene-
fits under laws administered by the Veterans' Administration. '0
Forfeiture may take place because the public interest demands it, despite the
absence of any fault in the holder. In a recent case the Civil Aeronautics Board
56. Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Corp. v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir.
1958). On remand, the District Court denied relief, 165 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1958).
57. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.
58. For example, the grant of a valuable federal savings and loan association charter
is said to rest in the virtually unreviewable discretion of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
59. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). See also § 3 of
the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1270 (1947), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1958) :
So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of this chapter, grazing
privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but the
creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to the provisions
of this chapter shall not create any right, title, interest or estate in or to the lands.
60. 72 Stat. 1240 (1958), 38 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1958). See Thompson v. Gleason,
317 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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took the position that "the public interest" would be furthered by cancelling
the certificate of the most successful of four competing air carriers in order
to help the others, which needed government subsidies.61
When the public interest demands that the government take over "property,"
the Constitution requires that just compensation be paid to the owner. But
when largess is revoked in the public interest, the holder ordinarily receives
no compensation. For example, if a television station's license were revoked,
not for bad behavior on the part of the operator, but in order to provide a
channel in another locality, or to provide an outlet for educational television,
the holder would not be compensated for its loss. This principle applies to
largess of all types. 62
In addition to being revocable without compensation, most forms of largess
are subject to considerable limitations on their use. Social Security cannot be
sold or transferred. A television license can be transferred only with FCC
permission. The possessor of a grazing permit has no right to change, improve,
or destroy the landscape. And use of most largess is limited to specified pur-
poses. Some welfare grants, for example, must be applied to support dependent
children. On the other hand, holders of government wealth usually do have a
power to exclude others, and to realize income.
The most significant limitation on use is more shbtle. To some extent, at
least, the holder of government largess is expected to act as the agent of "the
public interest" rather than solely in the service of his own self-interest. The
theory of broadcast licensing is that the channels belong to the public and
should be used for the public's benefit, but that a variety of private operators
are likely to perform this function more successfully than government; the
holder of a radio or television license is therefore expected to broadcast in
"the public interest." The opportunity for private profit is intended to serve
as a lure to make private operators serve the public.
The "mix" of public and private, and the degree to which the possessor acts
as the government's agent, varies from situation to situation. The government
contractor is explicitly the agent of the government in what he does; in theory
he could equally well be the manager of a government-owned factory. Only
his right to profits and his control over how the job is done distinguish his
private status. The taxi driver performs the public service of transportation
(which the government might otherwise perform) subject to regulation but
with more freedom than the contractor. The doctor serves the public with
still greater freedom. The mother of a child entitled to public aid acts as the
61. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Boyd, 207 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1962),
vacated, 321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
62. See Osborn v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944), holding that a
grazing permit on public lands may be revoked without payment of just compensation,
and see ibid., n.5 for other illustrations. Compare Kanarek v. United States, 314 F.2d
802 (Ct. Cf. 1963), holding that withdrawal of the security clearance of a government
contractor's employee, causing him to lose his employment, was not a taking of property
for public use entitling the employee to compensation.
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state's agent in supporting the child with the funds thus provided, but her
freedom is even greater and the responsibility of her agency still less defined.
The result of all of this is a breaking down of distinctions between public and
private and a resultant blurring or fusing of public and private. Many of the
functions of government are performed by private persons; much private
activity is carried on in a way that is no longer private.
B. Largess and the Power of Government
1. Affirmative powers
When government - national, state, or local - hands out something of
value, whether a relief check or a television license, government's power
grows forthwith; it automatically gains such power as is necessary and proper
to supervise its largess. It obtains new rights to investigate, to regulate, and
to punish.63 This increase in power is furthered by an easy and wide-ranging
concept of relevance. A government contractor finds that he must comply
with wage-hour and child labor requirements. 4 Television and radio licensees
learn that their possible violation of the antitrust laws,65 or allegedly misleading
statements to the FCC,6 6 are relevant to their right to a license. Doctors find
they can lose their licenses for inflating bills that are used as a basis for claims
against insurance companies in accident cases, 67 and theaters are threatened
with loss of licenses for engaging in illegal ticket practices. 68 The New York
State Board of Regents includes in its definition of "unprofessional conduct"
by doctors, dentists, and other licensed professions any discrimination against
patients or clients on the basis of race, color or creed.6 9 Real estate brokers
can be suspended for taking advantage of racial tensions by the practice called
"blockbusting. ' 70 California has used its power over the privilege of selling
alcoholic beverages in order to compel licensed establishments to cease dis-
criminating. 71
63. For a general description of the powers gained by the government through con-
tracting, see Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry,
41 VA. L. Rnv. 27 (1955) ; Miller, Administration by Contract: A New Concern for the
Administrative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 957 (1961). On the powers derived from un-
employment compensation, see Note, Charity versus Social Insurance in Unemployment
Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357 (1963).
64. 49 Stat. 2036 (1942), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
65. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also Mansfield Journal
Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
66. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946). The court said that even if the facts con-
cealed were not material, and did not affect the Commission: "The fact of concealment
may be more significant than the facts concealed." Id. at 227.
67. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1962, p. 23, col. 8.
68. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1962, p. 33, col. 8.
69. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1962, § 2, p. 1, col. 1.
70. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
71. 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 658 (1960). For proposals concerning other ways in which
largess could be used to advance the cause of civil rights, see THE PoTomAc INSTrUTE,
STATE ExEcUTIVE AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE CIVIw RIGHTS (1963).
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One of the most significant regulatory by-products of government largess is
power over the recipients' "moral character." Some random illustrations will
suggest the meaning and application of this phrase. The District of Columbia
denied a married man in his forties a permit to operate a taxi partly because
when he was a young man in his twenties, he and a woman had been discovered
about to have sexual intercourse in his car.7 2 Men with criminal records have
been denied licenses to work as longshoremen and chenangoes 73 and prevented
from holding union office for the same reason.74 A license to operate a rooming
house may be refused for lack of good character.75 Sonny Liston was barred
from receiving a license to box in New York because of his "bad character."76
Louisiana attempted to deny aid to dependent children if their mothers were
of bad character.77
Political activities are also regulated by use of largess power. The Hatch
Act forbids federal employees to engage in political activities on pain of loss
of their jobs ;78 the act was also made applicable to state employees engaged
in activities aided by the federal government.79 But political activities thought
to be subversive or communistic have been the chief area of concern. One of
the earliest illustrations is the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, which
sought to prevent any member of the Communist Party or Nazi Bund from
getting work under the act. 0 Another example is the effort - ultimately
frustrated by the courts - to bar communists or subversives from occupying
public housing.8 1 Attempts to justify such restrictions followed these lines:
New York City officials proposed to invest city pension funds solely in the securities
of companies that do not practice racial discrimination, but the City was told by the Cor-
poration Counsel that it had no such authority under existing law. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1963, p. 1, cols. 3-4; p. 24, cols. 1-2.
72. Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962). The court held that the find-
ing that the applicant lacked good moral character was not supported, and ordered the
issuance of a license.
73. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1962, p. 86, cols. 7-8.
74. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Serio v. Liss, 189 F. Supp. 358
(D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 300 F2d 386 (1961).
75. Brown v. Tobriner, 218 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1963).
76. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1962, p. 18, col. 1.
77. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 233 (1950). Louisiana sought to define as an
"unsuitable home" one in which a parent "has had an illegitimate child after having re-
ceived a public assistance check," [§ 233 D(10)] and sought to provide that "in no in-
stance shall assistance be granted to an illegitimate child if the mother of the illegitimate
child in question is the mother of two or more illegitimate children, unless it should be
determined that the conception and birth of such child was due to extenuating circum-
stances .. ." (§ 233 C). See Memorandum from Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare to Commissioner of Social Security, Jan. 16, 1961.
78.. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
79. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
80. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1941, § 15(f), 54 Stat. 611, 620 (1941).
8L See Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S.
2d 712, rev'd, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954) ; Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270
Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1957); Chicago Housing
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... since low-rent housing projects are subsidized by taxpayers' money,
the special benefits thereof shall be available only to loyal tenants, and
not to those who elect to join and support organizations whose purposes
are inimical to the public welfare.8 2
Membership in the Communist Party or subversive organizations has been
considered relevant to the right to pursue a number of important occupations
and professions, including that of the lawyer,8 3 the radio-telegraph operator, 8 4
and the port worker.8 5 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reasoned
as follows:
It seems to us it would be difficult to imagine a question more relevant or
more material to the qualification of a radio operator .... Radio beams
are the operational essence of quick modern communication and the con-
trol of modern weapons. Not only the power to use these electronic de-
vices but the power to interfere with waves being used by others should,
it might properly seem to the Commission, be lodged in those whose
loyalty to the United States is made to appear."6
Nor does the list stop at occupations. Ohio required a loyalty oath to receive
unemployment compensation.87 For a time a loyalty oath was required under
the National Defense Education Act.8 8 New York has provided for the man-
Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319 (1954); Rudder v. United States, 105 A.2d 741
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1954), rev'd, 226 F.2d, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Authority
v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955).
82. Rudder v. United States, 105 A.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1954), rcev'd,
226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also Peters v. New York City Housing Authority,
283 App. Div. 801, 802, 128 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (1954), rev'd, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d
529 (1954), where the Appellate Division said:
Furthermore, in the present day context of world crisis after crisis, it is our opinion
that the danger Congress is seeking to avoid (i.e. infiltration of government
housing by subversive elements) justifies the requirement that tenants herein choose
between government housing and membership in an organization they know to
have been found subversive by the Attorney General.
Both these expressions of philosophy are taken from cases that were reversed on appeal.
83. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82
(1961).
84. Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Blumenthal v. FCC, 318 F.2d
276 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Among the evidence used to identify radio operators of unsuitable
character were: subscribing to Communist publications, activities of applicant's wife and
father-in-law, Communist Party membership, etc., Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719,
721-22 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
85. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
86. Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d 666, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Homer v.
Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961) :
In view, especially at this period of our national life, of the sensitive nature of
the positions involved - radio-telegraph operators on vessels of the Merchant
Marine - positions closely associated with the nation's security, we think consid-
eration of the ideological matters referred to is permitted under the statute. ...
Id. at 723.
87. Dworken v. Collopy, 91 N.E.2d 564 (C.P. Ohio 1950); State v. Hamilton, 92
Ohio App. 285, 110 N.E.2d 37 (1951).
88. 20 U.S.C. § 401-549 (1958).
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datory revocation of the driver's license of any motorist convicted under the
Smith Act of advocating the overthrow of the government.8 9
The restrictions which derive from these expanded notions of relevance are
enforceable not merely by withholding largess, but also by imposing sanctions.
Along with largess goes the power to punish new crimes. Misuse of the gift
becomes criminal, and hence new standards of lawful behavior are set: gov-
ernment can make it a crime to fail to spend welfare funds in such a manner as
accords with the best interests of the children.
Government largess not only increases the legal basis for government power;
it increases the political basis as well. When an individual or a business uses
public money or enjoys a government privilege or occupies part of the public
domain, it is easier to argue for a degree of regulation which might not be
accepted if applied to businesses or individuals generally. Objections to regu-
lation fade, whether in the minds of the general public or legal scholars, before
the argument that government should make sure that its bounty is used in
the public interest. Benefits, subsidies, and privileges are seen as "gifts" to
be given on conditions, and thus the political and legal sources of government
power merge into one.
2. The magnification of governmental power by adninistrative discretion
Broad as is the power derived from largess, it is magnified by many adminis-
trative factors when it is brought to bear on a recipient. First, the agency
granting government largess generally has a wide measure of discretion to
interpret its own power. Second, the nature of administrative agencies, the
functions they combine, and the sanctions they possess, give them additional
power. Third, the circumstances in which the recipients find themselves some-
times makes them abettors, rather than resisters of the further growth of
power.
The legislature generally delegates to an administrative agency its authority
with respect to a given form of largess. In this very process of delegation there
can be an enlargement of power. The courts allow the agencies a wide measure
of discretion to make policy and to interpret legislative policy. Sometimes a
legislature gives the agency several different, possibly conflicting policies,
allowing it (perhaps unintentionally) to enforce now one and now another.90
89. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRaFFic LAW § 510, 11 2(b). Before the enactment of this
law, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles attempted to deny a license to a convicted
Communist on the ground that he was not a "fit" person, but this action, was overturned
in Davis v. Hults, 24 Misc. 2d 954, 204 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The legislature
then hastened to amend the statute.
90. For example, in California the State Board of Barber Examiners may dispense
certificates for operating barber colleges in, any given area after considering:
(a) The economic character of the community.
(b) The adequacy of existing barber shops and barber colleges in that com-
munity.
(c) The ability of the community to support the proposed barber college.
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There is little if any requirement of consistency or adherence to precedent,
and the agency may, instead of promulgating rules of general application, make
and change its policies in the process of case-to-case adjudication.91 For ex-
ample, New Jersey's Waterfront Commission has power "in its discretion"
to deny the right to work to any longshoreman if he is a person "whose presence
at the piers or other waterfront terminals in the Port of New York is found
by the commission on the basis of the facts and evidence before it, to con-
stitute a danger to the public peace or safety." 92 The discretion of an agency
is even broader, and even less reviewable, when the subject matter is highly
technical. In such fields, which are increasing in number, "experts" or pro-
fessionals come to power, and their actions are even harder to confine within
legislatively fixed limits. Discretion as to enforcement or punishment is one
of the greatest of agency powers. A licensing agency often has power to choose
between forgiveness, suspension, and permanent revocation of a license after
a violation.93
Different agency powers can augment each other, as the story of New York's
television channel thirteen illustrates. When channel thirteen was put up for
sale, the Federal Communications Commission wanted the transferee to be
an educational television station. But although the FCC has plenary power to
dispense channels initially, Congress expressly denied it the authority to pass
on the comparative merits of would-be transferees. In this case a non-educa-
tional organization was the higher bidder, and would have been the purchaser
if the seller followed its natural self-interest. But the FCC can cause costly,
indefinite delay by commencing a general investigation. Here it used this
power as a threat. The seller was given reason to fear that a time-consuming,
expensive investigation would be commenced unless it sold to the lowest
bidder, an educational group. Pressed by circumstances, the seller bowed.
The FCC thus exercised a power denied it by Congress.9"
Most dispensing agencies possess the power of delay. They also possess the
power of investigation and harassment; they can initiate inquiries which will
prove expensive and embarrassing to an applicant. Surveillance alone can make
a recipient of largess uncomfortable. And agencies have so many criteria to
use, so many available grounds of decision, and so much discretion, that they,
like the FCC, can usually find other grounds to accomplish what they cannot
do directly. This is a temptation to the honest but zealous administrator, and
(d) The character of adjacent communities and the extent to which the college
would draw patrons from such adjacent communities.
(e) The social and economic effect of the establishment of a barber college on
the community where it is proposed to be located, and on the adjacent communities.
CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE §6534.7.
91. See generally JAFFE & NATHANSON, AD INISTRATIVE LAW ch. 3 (1961).
92. NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. § 32:23-29(c) (1963).
93. See Associated Securities Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1961).
94. Guthman, The Channel 13 Case: FCC Intervention in a § 310(b) License Trans-
fer, 1962 (unpublished paper in Yale Law Library).
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an invitation to the official who is less than scrupulous. In addition, the broader
the regulation, the greater the chance that everyone violates the law in some
way, and the greater the discretion to forgive or to punish. But even if a dis-
pensing agency is self-restrained and scrupulous beyond the requirements of
statutes, the function of dispensing will make its power grow. The dispensing
of largess is a continuing process. The threat of an unfavorable attitude in
the future should be sufficient persuasion for today.
The recipients of largess themselves add to the powers of government by
their uncertainty over their rights, and their efforts to please. Unsure of their
ground, they are often unwilling to contest a decision. The penalties for being
wrong, in terms of possible loss of largess in the future, are very severe.95
Instead of contesting, recipients are likely to be overzealous in their acceptance
of government authority so that a government contractor may be so anxious
to root out "disloyal" employees that he dismisses men who could probably
be retained consistently with government policy. Likewise a "think institute"
existing primarily on government contracts, may be more eager to "think"
along accepted lines because it has its next month's bills to "think" about.96
This penumbral government power is, indeed, likely to be greater than the
sum of the granted powers. Seeking to stay on the safe side of an uncertain,
often unknowable line, people dependent on largess are likely to eschew any
activities that might incur official displeasure. Beneficiaries of government
bounty fear to offend, lest ways and means be found, in the obscure corners
of discretion, to deny these favors in the future.
C. Largess and Procedural Safeguards
The procedural law of government largess is as distinctive as the substantive.
In addition to the general law governing the grant and revocation of largess,
there are special aspects of unusual interest: the power to conduct trials of
persons for alleged violations of law, and the authority to apply sanctions
and punishments.
1. Procedures: in general
The granting, regulation, and revocation of government largess is carried
on by procedures which, in varying degrees, represent short-cuts that tend
to augment the power of the grantor at the expense of the recipient. In the
first place, the tribunal is likely to be an arm of the granting agency rather
than independent and impartial. For example, when disputes arise over gov-
ernment contracts, the tribunal may turn out to be the government contracting
95. The dangers of contesting are shown by Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.
1962). A pilot of 12 years' experience was suspended for 60 days because of a minor
violation. He contested this order and appealed to the Civil Aeronautics Board. There-
upon the Board commenced a full scale investigation of his entire 12-year career, an
investigation, which ended with revocation of all of his certificates for a minimum period
of one year. Id., 590-91.
96. See Hart, The Research Enterprise and Defense Planning, May, 1963 (unpub-
lished paper in Yale Law Library).
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officer, himself a party to the dispute, followed by a series of contract appeals
boards likewise composed of government contracting officials. More commonly
the initial tribunal is a hearing officer, but the final decision is by the dis-
pensing agency itself. Thus a charge that a television licensee is violating the
terms of its license is ultimately passed upon by the FCC itself. A pilot can
be suspended by the CAB, which previously investigated the accident out of
which the suspension resulted, and earlier found in a "probable cause" inves-
tigation and hearing that the accident was due to pilot error. T
These tribunals not only lack independence; they may fail to provide other
safeguards as well. Sometimes decisions are based upon evidence not in the
record or upon evidence which the recipient has no opportunity to test by
cross-examination or upon "expert" opinions which are virtually immune to
adversary procedures familiar to the courtroom. The agency's own "expertise"
may also be a factor of importance in the decision. Sometimes there is no
hearing at all; for example, the SEC has been upheld in suspending, without
a hearing, a broker-dealer license for alleged violations.98 Drivers licenses are
also sometimes suspended without a hearing.99
Decisions concerning government largess are not always subject to effective
review in the courts. An application for a savings and loan charter can be
granted or denied without judicial review. The matter rests in the "vast
discretion" of a federal board.100 A local agricultural committee, exercising
authority under the federal soil bank subsidy program, has virtually unreview-
able authority to find a farmer in violation of the rules of the program, making
him subject to statutory forfeitures.' 0' At present there is a trend toward more
judicial review, but the important question is what kind of review; review
limited to constitutional or jurisdictional questions may prove inadequate to
curb possible agency abuses.
2. Trials
Among the matters which may be relevant to the granting or revocation
of government largess are various types of law violations, civil and criminal
97.' Pangbum v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349 (lst Cir. 1962).
An extreme example of combined functions is the body known as the Board of Regents
of the University of the State of New York. Among its other duties, the Board grants
licenses for most of the professions except law. It sets the standards for admission to the
professions, establishes regulations to govern professional conduct, prefers charges of
unprofessional conduct, hears and decides the charges, and metes out punishment. The
executive, legislative, and judicial functions are thus combined in a single agency having
life-and-death power over an individual's professional life. See Barsky v. Board of Re-
gents, 347 U.S. 442, 461 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
98. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
99. E.g., Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953).
100. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Rowe, 284 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (denial
of charter for a federal savings and loan association not reviewable). See also Schwab
v. Quesada, 284 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1960) (order of the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Agency, under the Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat. 174, 49 U.S.C. § 1108 (1958),
approving aid funds for municipal airport is not reviewable).
101. Holden v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
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in nature. Violations of law are normally determined by courts. But in dis-
pensing largess government has not always been willing to rely on courts to
determine whether laws have been violated. In an increasing number of cases
it has undertaken to make such determinations independently. And thereby
it has exercised an extraordinary procedural power - the power to try law
violations in the executive branch, without benefit of judge or jury. It is true
that these "trials" cannot result in imposition of criminal sanctions. But the
ability to conduct trials and adjudications is of great significance in itself,
and the denial of benefits which may follow approximates a sanction.
One of the most important federal trial-conducting agencies is the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which dispenses broker-dealer licenses and other
privileges of great value. The SEC revokes licenses for violations of the
Securities Act - violations which it determines for itself.10 2 Like power is
exercised by other federal agencies. The CAB can take away a pilot's license
on the basis of an agency "trial" proving that he violated regulations. 10 3 The
FCC has "found" that an applicant for a broadcast license was guilty of an
attempt to deceive the Commission.'0 4 State agencies also conduct trials in
many different circumstances. 05
The "trials" just discussed have at least the virtue of relating to matters
within the special expertise of the agency. But the power to "try" also extends
to matters that are more within the special competence of courts than of the
agency conducting the "trial." This is clearly the case with the FCC, which
disclaims any expertise in the area of the antitrust laws, but insists that it
can make findings on monopolistic practices without the aid of a court, and
deny licenses on the basis of such findings. 10 6 The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals justified such proceedings as follows:
Mansfield alleges that the Commission's finding of an intent and practice
of suppressing competition is equivalent to convicting the appellant of
a crime, and that withholding a license on the basis of such a finding is
identical to the imposition of a penalty. Thus, it is claimed that the con-
102. E.g., Associated Securities Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1961).
103. Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962).
104. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946) ; Immaculate Conception Church v. FCC,
320 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
An extreme example of federal trial power is illustrated by Thompson v. Gleason, 317
F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Administrator of Veterans Affairs conducts trials under
a statute providing for forfeiture of veterans benefits for conduct including mutiny, treason,
and rendering assistance to an enemy. The Administrator originally assumed authority
not only to conduct an independent trial, with his own witnesses, evidence, and stand-
ards of guilt; he also claimed that he could decide what amounted to rendering assistance
to any enemy. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Adminis-
trator must be limited to finding that a beneficiary had committed defined criminal acts
under a criminal statute. But it left him free to conduct his own trial.
105. See, e.g., Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d 178, 273 P.2d 572 (1954).
106. Nothing in the provisions or history of the Act lends support to the inference
that the Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station not
operating in the "public interest," merely because its misconduct happened to be an
unconvicted violation of the antitrust laws.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
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stitutional right to a trial by jury has been denied. We believe we have
made it clear that the findings of the Commission do not constitute con-
viction of a crime or the equivalent. The ultimate matter in question was
not whether Mansfield was innocent or guilty, but whether qualified or
unqualified, and the appellant's conduct was considered only in that
regard. Nor does the withholding of a privilege, granted by the Govern-
ment only to fully-qualified applicants, amount to a penalty, when there
is sound basis for finding the applicant unfit. 0 7
The same practice on a local level is illustrated by the case of a New York
City taxicab driver who was brought before a police captain and charged
with having withheld change from a passenger. The officer found him guilty,
and his license was revoked. The New York Court of Appeals subsequently
held that the procedures used by the police violated due process, but the
court seemed to agree that the police could "try" taxi drivers if they observed
better procedures. 08
Administrative "trials" are not even limited to conduct that might violate
some law. Agencies can deny government largess for "bad" conduct which is
lawful. This often happens when a license is denied because of "bad character."
Many largess-dispensing agencies are concerned with character - from the
SEC to state boxing commissions. The entire federal loyalty-security program
for public employees involves trials of character. Here the "gift" of a public
job has been the justification for a process by which countless individuals
have been "tried" for "offenses" which vary from conduct approaching treason
to the most trivial departure from orthodoxy. These security trials, and the
character investigations which are made for innumerable licenses and permits,
attempt to search out every crevice and recess of an individual's life. The
agencies try not an offense but the whole of a man, his strengths and weak-
nesses, his moments of honor and of temptation. 10 9
Perhaps the greatest extreme reached by agency trial power is illustrated
by motor vehicle bureaus, which sometimes find motorists "guilty" after courts
have found them innocent. In New Jersey the Director of the Division of
Motor Vehicles may suspend a driver's license (a) where the individual has
been acquitted of the charge by a court or (b) where the individual has been
convicted and punished, but the additional punishment of license suspension
was expressly withheld by the sentencing court. The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the Director's action was not penal, and that there was no
double jeopardy."10 The District of Columbia Corporation Counsel maintains
107. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F2d 28, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
108. Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
109. In Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), the Civil Aeronautics Board
undertook a "full scale investigation?' of a pilot, which according to the Court "took over
8 months to complete, covering several thousand miles and brought into review 12 years
of Nadiak's professional career." Id. at 590.
110. Atkinson v. Parseldan, 37 N.J. 143, 179 A.2d 732 (1962). See also Common-
wealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936). In the Atkinson case the court said:
Although the suspension or revocation of a driver's license by the Director may
appear to be punishment to the wrongdoer, this is not enough to characterize the
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that the motor vehicles director can revoke a permit even though a court
acquits the motorist of any charges. He declared that motor vehicle officials
"may consult evidence other than court findings." The Director of Motor
Vehicles said, reassuringly, that "he would revoke a permit in the face of a
court finding only if there was strong evidence that the action was war-
ranted."'
3. New and umusual punishments
Administering largess carries with it not only the power to conduct trials,
but also the power to inflict many sorts of sanctions not classified as criminal
punishments. The most obvious penalty is simply denial or deprivation of some
form of wealth or privilege that the agency dispenses. How badly this punish-
ment hurts depends upon how essential the benefit is to the individual or
business affected. The loss of some privileges or subsidies may be quite trivial.
But for the government contractor placed on a blacklist the consequences may
be financial ruin if the government is one of its major customers. The tele-
vision station which loses its license is out of business. So is the doctor who
loses his medical license.
Although the denial of benefits is consistently held not to be penal in nature,
it is perfectly clear that on occasion the government uses this power as a sanc-
tion. The FCC has denied a radio or television license as a sanction for the
applicant's misrepresentations to the Commission." 2 Government contractors
who are guilty of undesirable conduct may be officially "debarred" from con-
tracting for a specified term of years.11 Persons guilty of prior crimes may
statutory grant of power as criminal in nature. The primary object of the statute
is to foster safety on the highway and not to impose criminal punishment to vin-
dicate public justice.
37 N.J. at 155, 179 A.2d at 738.
111. The Washington, Post, Nov. 15, 1961, p. B4, cols. 1-2. Compare Meyer v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949), where a State board of
medical examiners suspended a physician's license for conviction of an offense, despite the
fact that, under the State's rehabilitation procedures, the sentencing court discharged
the physician from probation and dismissed the charges against him. Charges were dis-
missed under a statute which said that after trial the defendant "shall thereafter be re-
leased from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he
has been convicted." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4.
112. In FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946), the Court rejected this contention in
the following paragraph:
It is also contended that this order inflicts a penalty, that the motive is punish-
ment and that since the Commission is given no powers to penalize persons, its
order must fall .... A denial of an application, for a license because of the in-
sufficiency or deliberate falsity of the information lawfully required to be furnished
is not a penal measure. It may hurt and it may cause loss, but it is not made
illegal, arbitrary or capricious by that fact.
Id. at 228.
113. See, e.g., Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368, 372 (D.C.
Cir. 1961). See generally Gantt & Panzer, The Government Blacklist: Debarment and
Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 175 (1957) ;
Administrative Conference of the United States, Committee on Adjudication of Claims,
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be disqualified from office in waterfront unions.11 4 The CAB suspends pilots'
licenses for the purpose of punishment:
The Board takes the position that quite apart from the qualifications or
competency of a pilot, it has the right under Section 609 to impose a sus-
pension as a "sanction" against specific conduct or because of its "deter-
rence value - either to the subject offender or to others similarly situ-
ated." In short, the Board contends that it may order suspension for dis-
ciplinary purposes. We agree with the Board.115
Denial of benefits by no means exhausts the list of sanctions available to
government. Severe harm can be inflicted by adverse publicity resulting from
investigations, findings of violation, blacklisting, or forfeitures for cause. A
striking instance is the SEC practice, upheld by the courts, of placing alleged
violators of certain of its regulations on a public blacklist.116 Forfeitures are
imposed under agricultural stabilization programs.117 The mere pendency of
proceedings may be harmful, especially if accompanied by costly and harass-
ing investigation and interminable delay.
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST STATE
What are the consequences of the rise of government largess and its attendant
legal system? What is the impact on the recipient, on constitutional guaranties
of liberty, on the structure of power in the nation? It is important to try to
picture the society that is emerging, and to seek its underlying philosophy. The
dominant theme, as we have seen, is "the public interest," and out of it there
grows the "public interest state."
A. The Erosion of Independence
The recipient of largess, whether an organization or an individual, feels the
government's power. The company that is heavily subsidized or dependent
on government contracts is subjected to an added amount of regulation and
inspection, sometimes to the point of having resident government officials in
its plant.11 8 And it is subject to added government pressures. The well known
episode when the large steel companies were forced to rescind a price rise,
partly by the threat of loss of government contracts, illustrates this. Perhaps
the most elaborate and onerous regulation of businesses with government con-
tracts is the industrial security system, which places all employees in defense
industries under government scrutiny, and subjects them, even high executives,
to dismissal if they fail to win government approval.11 9
Committee Report on Debarment and Suspension, of Persons from Government Contract-
ing and Federally Assisted Construction Work (1962).
114. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
115. Pangburnv. CAB, 311 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1962).
116. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
117. Holden v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
118. PEcK & SCHERER, TE WEONs AcQuisiTioN PROCESS: AN EcoNoMzc ANAL-
Ysis 85 (1962).
119. See, e.g., Kanarek v. United States, 314 F.2d 802 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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Universities also feel the power of government largess. Research and de-
velopment grants to universities tend to influence the direction of university
activities, and in addition inhibit the university from pursuing activities
it might otherwise undertake.' 20 In order to qualify for government contracts,
Harvard University was required, despite extreme reluctance, to report the
number of Negroes employed in each department. The University kept no
such information, and contended that gathering it would emphasize the very
racial distinctions that the government was trying to minimize. Nevertheless,
the University was forced to yield to the Government's demand.' 21
Individuals are also subject to great pressures. Dr. Edward K. Barsky, a
New York physician and surgeon since 1919, was for a time chairman of the
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee.' z2 In 1946 he was summoned before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In the course of his exami-
nation he refused, on constitutional grounds, to produce records of the organi-
zation's contributions and expenditures. For this refusal he served six months
in jail for contempt of Congress. Thereafter the New York State Education
Department filed a complaint against him, under a provision of law making
any doctor convicted of a crime subject to discipline. Although there was no
evidence in any way touching Dr. Barsky's activities as a physician, The De-
partment's Medical Grievance Committee suspended his medical license for
six months. The New York courts upheld the suspension. The New York
Court of Appeals answered as follows the argument that its holding would
subject individuals to arbitrary governmental power:
Appellants suggest that a literal construction of section 6514 (subd. 2,
par. [b]) will empower the Board of Regents to destroy a person, pro-
fessionally, solely on a showing of the commission by him in some other
State (or country) of an act which we in New York consider noncriminal,
or even meritorious. Two answers are available to that: first, some re-
liance must be placed on the good sense and judgment of our Board of
Regents, in handling any such theoretically possible cases; and, second,
the offense here committed, contempt of Congress, is no mere trivial
,transgression of an arbitrary statute.'2
On appeal, the suspension was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.'2
The Court declared that New York had "substantially plenary power" to fix
conditions for the practice of medicine, 25 and concluded that the state's action
120. Kirk, Massive Subsidies and Academic Freedom, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
607 (1963). But see Kidd, The Implications of Research Funds for Academic Freedom,
27 LAw & CoNTE P. PRoB. 613 (1963).
121. Harvard Summer News, July 12, 1962, p. 1, col. 1. The report states that Har-
vard officials felt that to keep such records would be an invasion of the privacy of the
individual, and that a "visual survey" would be "surreptitious and unhealthy and repug-
nant to the dignity of the individual." However the report said that the government in-
sisted that the check be made.
122. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
123. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 89, 97-98, 111 N.E2d 222, 225-26 (1953).
124. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
125. Id. at 451.
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was reasonable, especially "in a field so permeated with public responsibility
as that of health."'1 2
6
If the businessman, the teacher, and the professional man find themselves
subject to the power of government largess, the man on public assistance is
even more dependent. Welfare officials, often with the best of motivations,
impose conditions intended to better a client, which sometimes are a deep
invasion of his freedom of action. 127 In a memorable case in New York, an
old man was denied welfare because he insisted on living under unsanitary
conditions, sleeping in a barn in a pile of rags. The court's opinion expresses
a characteristic philosophy:
Appellant also argues that he has a right to live as he pleases while being
supported by public charity. One would admire his independence if he
were not so dependent, but he has no right to defy the standards and
conventions of civilized society while being supported at public expense.
This is true even though some of those conventions may be somewhat
artificial. One is impressed with appellant's argument that he enjoys the
life he leads in his humble "home" as he calls it. It may possibly be true,
as he says, that his health is not threatened by the way he lives. After all
he should not demand that the public at its expense, allow him to experi-
ment with a manner of living which is likely to endanger his health so
that he will become a still greater expense to the public.
It is true, as appellant argues, that the hardy pioneers of our country
slept in beds no better than the one he has chosen. But, unlike the appel-
lant, they did it from necessity, and unlike the appellant, they did not
call upon the public to support them, while doing it.1 28
To envision how sweeping the powers derived from government largess
can become, one may turn to New York City, where the Commissioner of
Licenses holds sway over a long list of gainful employments. With broad
discretion, he dispenses and revokes licenses for exhibitions and performances,
billiard and pool tables, bowling alleys, miniature golf, sidewalk cafes and
stands, sightseeing guides, street musicians, public carts, expressmen, porters,
junk dealers, second-hand dealers, pawnbrokers, auctioneers, laundries, ward-
robe concessionaires, locksmiths, masseurs, bargain sales, bathhouse keepers,
rooming houses, barbers, garages, refuse removal, cabarets, coffee houses, and
126. Id. at 453.
127. A report on the Aid to Dependent Children Program (ADC) in Chicago com-
ments:
The climate in the department which places such emphasis on denying assistance,
and the lack of consistent application of IPAC [Illinois Public Aid Commission]
policies in the ADC program, is damaging to the applicant or recipient and serves
to prolong and perpetuate dependency. Some of the staff treat the families with
consideration and decency and try to be helpful and understanding while at the
same time adhering strictly to policy. Others are rigid and punitive, with little
regard for human dignity. Their attitudes are destructive of personality, ambition
and self-respect-and intensify existing problems.
GREENLEIGH ASSOCIATES, INC., FACTS, FALLACIES AND TEE FUTURE, A STUDY OF
THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 64 (1960).
128. Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 375, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (1941).
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cannon firing.120 The license commissioner has used his broad powers to deny
licenses to many persons on the basis of "bad character." For example, an appli-
cation for a junk-cart license was denied because the applicant had been charged
with several crimes, even though the most recent charge had occurred over
sixteen years before, and all of the charges had been dismissed.130 A parking
lot license was denied to an applicant for failure to disclose arrests for book-
making which had occurred some twelve years previously.131 Whatever the
merits of individual denials, the Commissioner seems to have no standards
to guide him.132 Nor has the Commissioner limited himself to denials for bad
character. He has used his power of revocation to regulate his licensees
in many ways. He threatened to revoke the licenses of theaters if he found
them accepting kickbacks on tickets. 133 He warned motion picture houses that
their licenses would be revoked if they did not clean up sidewalk displays of
"lurid and flamboyant" advertising, saying that such advertising was "a blight
over the important area of our city," and declaring, "If I have to close half
the theaters in the Times Square area to abate this nuisance, I am ready to
do so.''113 He revoked the licenses of three of New York's eight dance halls
that provide hostesses, and initiated proceedings against others, charging
that they were "lewd" and "offensive to public decency."'135 Many other inci-
dents might be cited. Again, the point is the absence of standards; broad
discretion to deny or revoke licenses "for cause" allows a commissioner to
do his own legislating and inflict his own punishments.
Vast discretion tends to corrupt. The New York State Liquor Authority,
having the power to grant valuable liquor licenses to a favored few, having
inadequately objective standards by which to make the choice, and operating
in secret, fell into a pattern of corruption in which it would dispense its favors
only in return for bribes and pay-offs, refusing to grant privileges to those
who were too honest, too ignorant, or too poor to play its game. Thus a dis-
pensing agency of government became little better than a shakedown racket. 3 6
The pressures on the individual are greatly increased by the interrelatedness
of society and the pervasiveness of regulation. The individual with a black
129. NEw YoRx Crr,, ADmINIsTRATIVE CODE ch. 32 (1956 & Supp. 1964).
130. Matter of Pinto, 142 N.Y.LJ., Oct. 29, 1959, p. 13, col. 8.
131. Benson Parking Corp. v. O'Connell, 31 Misc. 2d 1037, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Sup.
Ct. 1961) (dismissing petition for review).
132. The cases are collected in notes to NEW YoRx Crry, ADmINISTRATI-E CODE ch.
32 (1956 & Supp. 1964). Some articles of chapter 32 specifically refer to "good character"
as a qualification (e.g., art. 34, "Garages and Parking Lots"); but the Commissioner
applies the same requirement under articles which do not refer to it explicitly (e.g., art.
18, "Junk Dealers"; cf. note 130 supra).
133. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1962, p. 33, col. 8.
134. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1962, p. 39, col. 4.
135. A lawyer for one of the ballrooms charged that the Commissioner had "taken
the law into his own hands." N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1964, p. 27, col. 2.
136. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 19, col. 3. See Lewis v. City of Grand
Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Mich. 1963), for a detailed description of how liquor
licensing regulations might be used to discriminate against a Negro licensee.
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mark against him, merited or unmerited, finds that it dogs him everywhere,
from locality to locality, and from one kind of work to another. Even a moun-
tain guide in the west must now be a "person of good moral character" in
order to be licensed.'3 7 And licensing control can reach the point achieved
by New York, where all entertainers and cabaret employees must be finger-
printed.' 58 As judge J. Skelly Wright has pointed out, a man's "innermost
secrets... long buried and known only to himself" may pursue him wherever
he tries to find work.139 Indeed, the consequences of a criminal conviction, no
matter how innocuous the circumstances, are so serious and the structure of
regulation is so rigid that a bill was introduced in the New York City Council
to nullify the effect of criminal convictions growing out of participation in civil
rights demonstrations. 140 Caught in the vast network of regulation, the in-
dividual has no hiding place.
B. Pressures Against the Bill of Rights
The chief legal bulwark of the individual against oppressive government
power is the Bill of Rights. But government largess may impair the individual's
enjoyment of those rights.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York instituted an
inquiry into improper solicitation and handling of contingent retainers in per-
sonal injury cases in Brooklyn. Solicitation of legal business is a crime in New
York. In the course of the inquiry Albert Martin Cohen, an attorney for
thirty-nine years, was called to testify. In reply to approximately sixty ques-
tions, he pleaded his privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the
state constitution. The unanswered questions related to such matters as his
records in contingent retainer cases, the activities of his associates, and whether
he had paid others for referring cases to him. After warnings, disciplinary
proceedings were instituted against Cohen for refusing to cooperate with the
inquest, and he was disbarred by the Appellate Division.' 4 ' On review, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the disbarment.142 The Court quoted
137. Wyo. STAT. §§ 23-55 (1957).
138. NEv YoRK CITY, ADmINISTRATVE CODE ch. 32, art. 38, §§ B32-297.0, B32-304.0
(Supp. 1964).
139. Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion). In
this case, the Federal Aviation Agency removed an employee because it found that eight
years earlier, and long before his employment, he had committed at least four homosexual
acts (some for pay) while still a minor, and had smoked marijuana cigarettes on at
least five occasions.
140. The bill provided that "no person shall be denied any license, right, benefit or
privilege extended by this code, or suffer any other disability or disqualification there-
under, or be denied the right of employment by the city of New York" because of a con-
viction resulting from peaceful efforts to achieve equal rights. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1962,
p. 28, col. 3. The bill was enacted. NEw YoRKx Crry, ADmrisTRATmv CODE §§ AA51-1.0,
2.0.
141. In the Matter of Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1959), aff'd, 7
N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672 (1960).
142. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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with approval the following from the opinion of the New York Court of Ap-
peals:
Of course [petitioner] had the right to assert the privilege and to withhold
the criminating answers. That right was his as it would be the right of
any citizen and it was not denied to him. He could not be forced to waive
his immunity .... But the question still remained as to whether he had
broken the "condition" on which depended the "privilege" of membership
in the Bar..... "Whenever the condition is broken, the privilege is lost
"143
Thus the effect of the holding in Cohen is that a lawyer may lose his profession
if he exercises his constitutional privilege, or may have to relinquish his privi-
lege in order to keep his profession.
Similarly, in a case where a radio operator's license was denied by the FCC
because the applicant pleaded the privilege against self-incrimination, the
Court of Appeals upheld the Commission, but candidly admitted that the
effects of its decision on the privilege might be unfortunate:
Dismissal of an application for refusal of the applicant to fill the infor-
mational gap leads to an unhappy result. For it attaches significance to
exercise of the privilege, and exerts pressure upon the applicant to waive
it.... The application is sacrificed though the privilege is preserved. To
save both seems impossible. The choice is that of the applicant. 44
Pressures are also applied against the protection of the fourth amendment. In
the case of many public assistance programs, a power to make unannounced
searches of recipients' premises is asserted by administrators. The following
is typical:
Because the casework staff does not have an opportunity to learn enough
about their cases, a special investigation unit is used, primarily for the
purpose of ferreting out fraud through surprise visits made to the homes
of the recipients either on Sunday morning or after midnight. In ADC
it appears that the primary function of this unit is to find men in the home
where they [sic] are not supposed to be any, especially fathers, step-
fathers or acting fathers who are alleged to be absent.
In the sample of active cases studied some instances were reported in
which the special investigation teams in a surprise visit in the middle
of the night pushed past the one who answered the door and looked in
the closets and under the bed for evidence of male occupancy. One family
interviewed in this study complained of repeated harassment of this
kind. The family consisted of a mother, her teenage son and younger
143. Id. at 125-Z6 (brackets and, deletions by the Court), quoting from 7 N.Y.2d at
495, 166 N.E.2d at 675.
144. Blumenthal v. FCC, 318 F.2d 276, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Analogous reasoning
has been used to require a driver accused of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated
to submit to a blood test. He must waive his privilege against self-incrimination or suffer
suspension of his driver's license. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961). See
also Schlesinger v. Gates, 249 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 939
(1958), for a case of debarment of a government contractor based in part upon his refusal
to answer questions before a congressional committee (debarment upheld as validly based
upon prior defaults in performance).
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daughter. The mother and daughter slept in the combination living room,
dining room and bedroom, and the son slept in a small converted closet
off the bedroom. One night they were awakened at three o'clock in the
morning by loud knocking at their door. The son went to the door, which
opened into the bedroom occupied by the mother and daughter. Two men
pushed past him without identifying themselves as investigators from the
Department of Public Aid, and said they were looking for the father who
was reported to have returned home. Without apology they left, but
returned several weeks later at one o'clock in the morning, repeating the
same performance, again without finding their man. This experience has
had an unnerving effect on the entire family.145
Since persons receiving public assistance fear the loss of their subsistence, they
are unlikely to be able to assert their fourth amendment rights.14 6 They, like
the lawyers of New York State, must choose between their means of support
and one of their constitutional rights.
Largess also brings pressure against first amendment rights. The Pacifica
Foundation was for a long period in danger of losing its three radio licenses
because of "controversial" broadcasts, including "extreme" political views.
For an extended period the FCC delayed action on the Foundation's applica-
tion for renewals. Then the FCC demanded that the Foundation's directors,
officers, and managers give answers disclosing whether they were or had been
members of the Communist Party or of any groups advocating or teaching
the overthrow of government by force.147 The Foundation refused to an-
swer.148 Eventually the FCC renewed the licenses.' 49
145. GRENLEIGH AssocIATEs, Ixc., op. cit. supra note 127, at 66-67.
146. The Greenleigh Associates report continues:
In another case the mother complained of the special investigator arriving one
evening while she was taking a bath. He pushed past her nine year old daughter,
who answered the door-looked in the bedroom, all closets and the bathroom
searching for a man or evidence of male occupancy. He had no warrant. He did
find a suit in a closet belonging to the mother's boy friend, who visited her on
weekends and about whom the department had been, fully informed. Nevertheless,
assistance was discontinued on the assumption a man was living full time with
the family and that they should look to him for support-support which the part-
time boy friend could not provide. The mother and daughter appeared destitute and
malnourished at the time of the interview. Also, they had been so frightened by the
visit and the attitude of the special investigator that they were almost immobilized
with fear.
While such action is contrary to policy, like other policies it is sometimes
ignored in practice. It is inevitable that such abuses take place by overzealous in-
vestigators when such a unit exists. There appears to be a serious question of
violation of civil rights, about which the department should be concerned.
Id. at 67.
147. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 62, col. 5.
148. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 63, col. 2.
149. In re Applications of Pacifica Foundation FCC 64-43, 45386 (memorandum
opinion and order, January 22, 1964). The FCC has also put pressure against the First
Amendment rights of radio operators by requiring that they answer questions concerning
membership in subversive organizations. Upholding the Commission's power, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia said, "An unqualified right to pursue any chosen
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It takes a brave man to stand firm against the power that can be exerted
through government largess. This is nowhere better shown than by the case
of George Anastaplo. In the fall of 1950, Anastaplo passed the Illinois bar
examination, and applied for approval to the Committee on Character and
Fitness, which in Illinois has the duty "to examine applicants who appear
before them for moral character, general fitness to practice law and good
citizenship."'50 Anastaplo came from a small town in Illinois, served honorably
in the Air Force during World War II, and graduated from the University of
Chicago. In his written application, Anastaplo was asked to state his under-
standing of American constitutional principles. After mentioning such funda-
mentals as the separation of powers, and protection of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, Anastaplo added this sentence: "And, of course, when-
ever the particular government in power becomes destructive of these ends, it
is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and thereupon to establish a new
government."'"' When Anastaplo appeared before a subcommittee of the
Character Committee, the members showed great concern about the quoted
sentence - despite the fact that it is taken almost word for word from the
Declaration of Independence. Anastaplo was questioned in detail about his
"views on revolution." In the course of that questioning one member asked
him whether he was a member of any organization on the Attorney General's
list, or of the Communist Party. Anastaplo refused to answer these questions
on the ground that they were political questions which he was privileged not
to answer under the first amendment. After further hearings during which
Anastaplo stuck to his position, he was notified by the Committee that, solely
because of his failure to reply, he had failed to prove such qualifications as to
character and general fitness as would justify his admission to the bar of
Illinois. 152
The U. S. Supreme Court upheld the denial of admission, resting its de-
cision on the refusal to answer the question concerning Communist Party
membership. It held this question to be material to the issue of the applicant's
fitness, contending that the questions were material because of their "bearing
upon the likelihood that a bar applicant would observe as a lawyer the orderly
processes that lie at the rootsof this country's legal and political systems ... "153
As for the first amendment, the Court held that "the State's interest in en-
forcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about member-
ship in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of
occupation, merely by reason of the First Amendment, is a wholly untenable proposition."
Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Blumenthal v. FCC, 318
F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
150. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83 n.1 (1961).
151. Id. at 99 (Black, J., dissenting).
152. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
946 (1955) ; 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
153. 366 U.S. at 89 n.10.
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speech and association. . . -154 Justice Black, dissenting, said that the decision
would "humiliate and degrade" the Bar by forcing it "to become a group of
thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals."'16
-The foregoing cases suggest that the growth of largess has made it possible
for government to "purchase" the abandonment of constitutional rights. And
government, for a variety of reasons, has used this power in many circum-
stances. In particular, government employees, defense employees, members
of licensed occupations, and licensed businesses have felt pressure on their free-
dom of political expression and their right to plead the privilege against self-
incrimination. Recipients of largess remain free to exercise their rights, of
course. But the price of free exercise is the risk of economic loss, or even loss
of livelihood. 56
C. From Governmental Power to Private Power
The preceding description has pictured two fundamentally opposite forces:
government versus the private sector of society. Emphasis on a sharp dichotomy
highlights some of the relationships created by government largess. But to a
considerable extent this picture distorts reality. First, the impact of govern-
mental power falls unequally on different components of the private sector, so
that some gain while others lose. Second, government largess often creates a
partnership with some sectors of the private economy, which aids rather
than limits the objectives of those private sectors. Third, the apparatus of
governmental power may be utilized by private interests in their conflicts
with other interests, and thus the tools of government become private rather
than public instrumentalities.
154. Id. at 89.
155. Id. at 115-16.
156. Speaking of the attempt to deny public housing to members of certain organi-
zations designated as "subversive," the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
If a precedent should be established, that a governmental agency whose regulation,
is attacked by court action can successfully defend such an action on the ground
that plaintiff is being deprived thereby only of a privilege, and not of a vested
right, there is extreme danger that the liberties of any minority group in our popu-
lation, large or small, might be swept away without the power of the courts to
afford any protection.
The more that government engages in any activity formerly carried on by pri-
vate enterprise, the more real is the peril. For example, the number of rental units
for residence housing in the Authority's Hillside Terrace housing project consti-
tutes a very small percentage of the total of all such units in, Milwaukee, so that
the number of people subjected to pressure by enforcement of Resolution 513
would constitute but a nominal percentage of the total population of the city. On
the other hand, if the government, or an agency thereof, owned 90 per cent of all
rental units available for private housing in the nation as a whole, or even in a
particular state or municipality, the number of people subjected to pressure by such
a plan, of requiring a certificate of nonmembership as a condition of tenancy, would
be very considerable....
Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 275, 70 N.W.2d 605, 608-09 (1955).
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Inequalities lie deep in the administrative structure of government largess.
The whole process of acquiring it and keeping it favors some applicants and
recipients over others. The administrative process is characterized by uncer-
tainty, delay, and inordinate expense; to operate within it requires considerable
know-how. All of these factors strongly favor larger, richer, more experienced
companies or individuals over smaller ones. Only the most secure can weather
delay or seemingly endless uncertainty. A company accused of misusing a li-
cense can engage counsel to fight the action without being ruined by the ex-
penses of the defense; an individual may find revocation proceedings are
enough to send him to the poorhouse regardless of the outcome. And the large
and the small are not always treated alike. For example, small firms which deal
with the government are sometimes placed on a blacklist because of delinquen-
cies in performance, thus losing out on all government contracts. 157 But giant
contractors who are guilty of similar delinquencies are apparently not subject
to this drastic punishment. Similarly, regulation of taxicabs tends to be harder
on the individual owner or driver, who may lose his driver's license, while
little harm comes to the company controlling a fleet, which may lose drivers
but not its precious franchises.15
Beside this unacknowledged double standard there is also the fact that
sometimes the government quite openly favors one class of applicants - fre-
quently the large and successful. Atomic energy benefits have generally gone
to industry giants.' 59 Television channels seem to be in the hands of large
corporate applicants, often those which control newspapers or other stations.
Another illustration of this tendency is in the award of franchises for turnpike
restaurants; the business seems to go to large established chains, although
they can hardly be said to provide service of outstanding culinary distinction.' 60
All these inequalities modify somewhat the simple picture of a government-
private dichotomy. But a second modification is required: government and the
private sector (or a favored part of that sector) are often partners rather than
opposing interests. The concept of partnership covers many quite different
situations. Sometimes government largess serves to aid the private objectives
of an industry, as when government supplies grazing land to stockmen, timber
to the lumber industry, and scientific know-how to the private investors in
Telstar.16 ' A second type of partnership exists where governmental action pro-
157. See Garratt, Blacklisting of Contractors from Government Contracting and
Federally Financed Construction, November, 1962 (unpublished paper in Yale Law
Library).
158. See Taylor, Licensing and Control of the Taxicab Industry in, New York,
November, 1962 (unpublished paper in Yale Law Library).
159. Fraidin, How AEC Contracts Are Awarded-And To Whom, April, 1963
(unpublished paper in Yale Law Library).
160. Smith, Restaurant and Service Station Concessions on the Connecticut Turn-
pike, November, 1962 (unpublished paper in Yale Law Library).
161. Cohen, The Communications Satellite Act of 1962: An Inquiry Into the Use
of Research and Development, November, 1962 (unpublished paper in Yale Law Library).
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tects the recipient of largess from adverse forces with which he would otherwise
have to contend; this is illustrated by the defense contract, with its virtual guar-
antee against losses due to most economic or management factors.1 2 The Atomic
Energy Commission provides insurance against public liability due to negli-
gence.16 just as frequently, government largess offers protection against
the disadvantages of competition. ICC motor carrier regulation provides par-
tial monopolies for each trucker. CAB routes give partial monopolies to air-
lines. Professional or occupational licensing limits competition and adds a tone
of respectability and reliability as well. Often the leaders in seeking regulation
have been the persons affected, and not government or the general community;
the professional and occupational groups want government protection just as
the property owner wants zoning. 64 Sometimes licensing is a particularly
obvious cover for monopoly. An ordinance in Seattle limited to a handful the
number of persons or firms who could be licensed to operate juke boxes, but
allowed each licensee to have a large number of juke boxes in different estab-
lishments; this effectively restricted the business to a small but highly privi-
leged group. 165 The partnership of government and private may give further
protection - not merely from the consequences of competition, but also from
the legal consequences of eliminating competition. Some privilege-dispensing
agencies can exempt their clients from the antitrust laws, and, like the Mari-
time Board, use this power in connection with the grant of franchises to make
lawful all sort of anticompetitive practices that otherwise would violate the
Sherman Act.166
The federal government's role in defense and research and development has
created new forms of partnership. Substantial sectors of the economy become
committed to a system of government contracting in which both the contractors
and the politicians have a tremendous stake in the continuance of the system:
Increasingly, the success or failure of many politicians depends on their
getting Government contracts for their areas, and when they are success-
162. PECK & SCHERER, op. cit. supra note 118, at ch. 2-3.
163. Atomic Energy Act, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281
(1958).
164. Recent proposals in New York to place restrictions on the number of liquor
package store outlets, and to end price control, met with strong opposition from the liquor
industry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1964, p. 47, col. 4; p. 54, col. 2.
165. Ragan v. City of Seattle, 58 Wash. 2d 779, 364 P.2d 916 (1961). The ordinance
apparently had the effect of freezing the juke box licenses in the hands of those presently
holding them, but placed no effective limitation on the number of juke boxes in the city
each operator could have. The court acknowledged that the ordinance seemed to have
this effect, but said that the question was one for the City Council. Mallery, J., dissenting,
said: "Licensing legislation is more often than not sought by an organized group of the
particular persons to be licensed. Such measures, therefore, must be scrutinized to insure
that licenses are available to all eligible persons upon terms of equality to the end that
public protection, rather than special privilege, shall be implemented thereby." 58 Wash.
2d at 787-88, 364 P.2d at 921 (1961).
166. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1957).
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ful these contracts are so large that the companies concerned are lavish
with campaign contributions, or legal fees, or favors of other kinds. 167
The so-called "think institute," a product of the fashion for group research
and development, raises partnership to a new level. In effect the government
hires a private enterprise to do its thinking. The government directs a steady
flow of largess to the enterprise, and in return is told what it should think on
a variety of subjects; what it is told very likely will have an impact on the
future flow of largess. Thus a significant governmental power is actually placed
in private hands, and the private group is supported in its power by public
funds.1' s
Public-private partnerships attain their greatest significance when they are
translated into power. Sometimes private elements are able to take over the
vast governmental powers deriving from largess, and use them for their own
purposes. Thus, an exercise of governmental power may reflect the standards
of the dominant group in an industry or occupation, and represent an effort to
enforce these standards on others. The Isbrandtsen Company's troubles with
government agencies reflect the difficulties of the rate-cutter.169 The organized
bar's greater concern with "ambulance chasing" than with other ethical failings
reflects the dominant group's suspicion of the negligence lawyer. The revocation
of the license of a radio station in Kingstree, Georgia, for broadcasting "vulgar"
jokes 70 contrasts sharply with the failure of the FCC to criticize vulgarity on
the large television networks. Barsky v. Board of Regents,'7 where a physician
with a record of unpopular political activities was suspended from practice,
might also be deemed an illustration. Licensing creates a guild system, in
which an industry or occupational group can police itself. 172 By these means
an oligarchy dominates, competition is suppressed, and minority behavior re-
strained. It need hardly be added that the concept of "good moral character"
takes its content from majority values, as does the whole system of security
clearances. Industrial security requirements allow management to impose on
its employees a degree of orthodoxy foreign to ordinary employment policies
or collective bargaining.173
167. James Reston, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1963, p. 38, col. 3.
168. See Hart, supra note 96.
169. See Smith, Isbratdtsen - High Stakes on the High Seas, Fortune, Oct. 1961,
p. 223.
170. In re Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 23 Pike & Fisher, Radio Regulation 483
(1962).
171. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
172. See, e.g., Beatty v. State Board, 352 Pa. 565, 43 A.2d 127 (1945), showing how
the undertaling profession can make its own definitions of professional misconduct on
a case-to-case basis, and enforce them by license revocation.
Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, a committee of eligible producers
is empowered to make decisions affecting the interests of their fellow producers. See
Kephart v. Wilson, 219 F. Supp. 801, 827 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
173. When an employer not in defense work, and acting on his own initiative, dis-
misses an employee on political grounds, government largess may still play a role. The
right to unemployment compensation sometimes depends upon whether the claimant was
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In any society with powerful or dominant private groups, it is not unex-
pected that governmental systems of power will be utilized by private groups.
Hence the frequency with which regulatory agencies are taken over by those
they are supposed to regulate.174 Significantly, most of these agencies are also
the chief federal dispensers of largess. They quarrel with the industries they
regulate, but seen in a larger perspective these quarrels are all in the family.
In sum, the great system of power created by government largess is a ready
means to further some private groups, and not merely an advance in the
position of government over that which is "private" in society as a whole.
D. The New Feudalism
The characteristics of the public interest state are varied, but there is an
underlying philosophy that unites them. This is the doctrine that the wealth
that flows from government is held by its recipients conditionally, subject to
confiscation in the interest of the paramount state. This philosophy is epito-
mized in the most important of all judicial decisions concerning government
largess, the case of Flemming v. Nestor.'7 "
Ephram Nestor, an alien, came to this country in 1913, and after a long
working life became eligible in 1955 for old-age benefits under the Social
Security Act. From 1936 to 1955 Nestor and his employers had contributed
payments to the government which went into a special old-age and survivors
insurance trust fund. From 1933 to 1939 Nestor was a member of the Commu-
nist Party. Long after his membership ceased, Congress passed a law retro-
actively making such membership cause for deportation, and a second law,
also retroactive, making such deportation for having been a member of the
Party grounds for loss of retirement benefits. In 1956 Nestor was deported,
leaving his wife here. Soon after his deportation, payment of benefits to
Nestor's wife was terminated.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that cutting off Nestor's
retirement insurance, although based on conduct completely lawful at the time,
was not unconstitutional. Specifically, it was not a taking of property without
discharged from work for misconduct. In Ault Unemployment Compensation Case, 398
Pa. 250, 157 A.2d 375 (1960) ar employee was discharged after he invoked the fifth
amendment in testifying before a Senate committee. Thereafter he was denied unemploy-
ment compensation on, the ground that he had been guilty of wilful misconduct connected
with his work. The Pennsylvania Court reversed. It likewise reversed a denial of com-
pensation where the employer believed the dismissed employee was a Communist. Darin
Unemployment Compensation Case, 398 Pa. 259, 157 A.2d 407 (1960). The Maryland
court reached a result similar to Ault in Fino v. Maryland Employment Security Board,
218 Md. 504, 147 A.2d 738 (1958). But in Ostrofsky v. Maryland Employment Security
Board, 218 Md. 509, 147 A.2d 741 (1958) it was held that an employee's refusal to answer
questions about communist affiliation at a hearing held by the company (the company
being engaged in defense work) did constitute misconduct.
174. See, e.g., Huntington, The Maramns of the ICC: The Commission, The Rail-
roads, and The Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
175. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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due process of law; Nestor's benefits were not an "accrued property right."'17
The Court recognized that each worker's benefits flow "from the contributions
he made to the national economy while actively employed," but it held that
his interest is "noncontractual" and "cannot be soundly analogized to that of
the holder of an annuity."'1 77 The Court continued:
To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of "accrued property
rights" would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment of
ever-changing conditions which it demands . . . It was doubtless out of
an awareness of the need for such flexibility that Congress included ...
a clause expressly reserving to it "[t]he right to alter, amend or repeal
any provision" of the Act.... That provision makes express what is im-
plicit in the institutional needs of the program.178
The Court stated further that, in any case where Congress "modified" social
security rights, the Court should interfere only if the action is "utterly lacking
in rational justification."'179 This, the Court said, "is not the case here." As
the Court saw it, it might be deemed reasonable for Congress to limit pay-
ments to those living in this country; moreover, the Court thought it would
not have been "irrational for Congress to have concluded that the public purse
should not be utilized to contribute to the support of those deported on the
grounds specified in the statute."' 8 0
The implications of Flemming v. Nestor are profound. No form of govern-
ment largess is more personal or individual than an old age pension. No form
is more clearly earned by the recipient, who, together with his employer, con-
tributes to -the Social Security fund during the years of his employment. No
form is more obviously a compulsory substitute for private property; the tax
on wage earner and employer might readily have gone to higher pay and
higher private savings instead. No form is more relied on, and more often
thought of as property. No form is more vital to the independence and dignity
of the individual. Yet under the philosophy of Congress and the Court, a man
or woman, after a lifetime of work, has no rights which may not be taken away
to serve some public policy. The Court makes no effort to balance the interests
at stake. The public policy that justifies cutting off benefits need not even be
an important one or a wise one - so long as it is not utterly irrational, the
Court will not interfere. In any clash between individual rights and public
policy, the latter is automatically held to be superior.
The philosophy of Flemming v. Nestor, of Barsky, In Re Anastaplo, and
Cohen v. Hurley, resembles the philosophy of feudal tenure. Wealth is not
"owned," or "vested" in the holders. Instead, it is held conditionally, the con-
ditions being ones which seek to ensure the fulfillment of obligations imposed
by the state. Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal through a system
176. Id. at 608.
177. Id. at 609-10.
178. Id. at 610-11.
179. Id. at 611.
180. Id. at 612.
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of mutual dependence, obligation, and loyalty, so government largess binds
man to the state.' 8 ' And, it may be added, loyalty or fealty to the state is often
one of the essential conditions of modem tenure. In the many decisions taking
away government largess for refusal to sign loyalty oaths, belonging to "sub-
versive" organizations, or other similar grounds, there is more than a sugges-
tion of the condition of fealty demanded in older times.
The comparison to the general outlines of the feudal system may best be
seen by recapitulating some of the chief features of government largess.
(1) Increasingly we turn over wealth and rights to government, which reallo-
cates and redistributes them in the many forms of largess; (2) there is a
merging of public and private, in which lines of private ownership are blurred;
(3) the administration of the system has given rise to special laws and special
tribunals, outside the ordinary structure of government; (4) the right to
possess and use government largess is bound up with the recipient's legal
status; status is both the basis for receiving largess and a consequence of
receiving it; hence the new wealth is not readily transferable; (5) individuals
hold the wealth conditionally rather than absolutely; the conditions are usually
obligations owed to the government or to the public, and may include the
obligation of loyalty to the government; the obligations may be changed or
increased at the will of the state; (6) for breach of condition the wealth may
be forfeited or escheated back to the government; (7) the sovereign power is
shared with large private interests; (8) the object of the whole system is to
enforce "the public interest" - the interest of the state or society or the lord
paramount - by means of the distribution and use of wealth in such a way
as to create and maintain dependence.
This feudal philosophy of largess and tenure may well be a characteristic of
collective societies, regardless of their political systems. According to one
scholar, national socialism regarded property as contingent upon duties owed
the state; Nazism denied the absolute character of property and imposed obli-
gations conditioning property tenure: "In practice the development seems
to have been toward a concept of property based on the superior right of the
overlord."' 82 In Soviet Russia, the trend reportedly has been somewhat similar,
although starting from a different theoretical point. After denying the exis-
tence of private property, the Soviets have developed quasi-property, amount-
ing to the right to use and to have exclusive possession for a period of years.
Earnings in Russia are'also in a sense property, but computed in accordance
with the individual's contribution to the state.
1 83
181. See generally BLOCH, FEUDAL SocIErY (1961). Personal dependence was a
fundamental element of feudalism, expressed in the concept of being the "man" of another
man. Id. at 145.
182. Wunderlich, The National Socialist Conception of Landed Property, 12 SocL.
RESEAIcH 60, 75 (1945).
183. See GsovsKi, Sovr Crn LAW 106-07, 573-74, 582 (1948); HA-zARD, LAW
AND SocIAL CHANGE IN THE U.S.S.R. 133 (1953).
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The public interest state is not with us yet. But we are left with large ques-
tions. If the day comes when most private ownership is supplanted by govern-
ment largess, how then will governmental power over individuals be contained?
What will dependence do to the American character? What will happen to
the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, if their limits may be
bypassed by purchase, and if people lack an independent base from which to
assert their individuality and claim their rights? Without the security of the
person which individual wealth provides and which largess fails to provide,
what, indeed, will we become?
IV. PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN OLD DEBATE REvIsITE
The public interest state, as visualized above, -represents in one sense the
triumph of society over private property. This triumph is the end point of a
great and necessary "movement for reform. But somehow the result is different
from what the reformers wanted. Somehow the idealistic concept of the public
interest has summoned up a doctrine monstrous and oppressive. It is time to
take another look at private property, and at the "public interest" philosophy
that dominates its modern substitute, the largess of government.
A. Property and Liberty
Property is a legal institution the essence of which is the creation and pro-
tection of certain private rights in wealth of any kind. The institution performs
many different functions. One of these functions is to draw a boundary be-
t~veen public and private power. Property draws a circle around the activities
of each private individual or organization. Within that circle, the owner has
a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or explain
his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is master, and the state must
explain and justify any interference. It is as if property shifted the burden of
proof; outside, the individual has the burden; inside, the burden is on govern-
ment to demonstrate that something the owner wishes to do should not be done.
Thus, property performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity
and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to
yield to the owner. Whim, caprice, irrationality and "antisocial" activities
are given the protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of his
neighbors decry. The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while the
Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of conflict or
crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life.
Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the existence of
private property. Political rights presuppose that individuals and private groups
have the will and the means to act independently. But so long as individuals are
motivated largely by self-interest, their well-being must first be independent.
Civil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will not preserve
them.
Property is not a natural right but a deliberate construction by society. -If
such an institution did not exist, it would be necessary to create it, in order
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to have the kind of society we wish. The majority cannot be expected, on
specific issues, to yield its power to a minority. Only if the minority's will is
established as a general principle can it keep the majority at bay in a given
instance. Like the Bill of Rights, property represents a general, long range
protection of individual and private interests, created by the majority for the
ultimate good of all.
Today, however, it is widely thought that property and liberty are separable
things; that there may, in fact, be conflicts between "property rights" and
"personal rights." Why has this view been accepted? The explanation is found
at least partly in the transformations which have taken place in property.
During the industrial revolution, when property was liberated from feudal
restraints, philosophers hailed property as the basis of liberty, and argued
that it must be free from the demands of government or society.184 But as pri-
vate property grew, so did abuses resulting from its use. In a crowded world,
a man's use of his property increasingly affected his neighbor, and one man's
exercise of a right might seriously impair the rights of others. Property be-
came power over others; the farm landowner, the city landlord, and the work-
ing man's boss were able to oppress their tenants or employees. Great aggre-
gations of property resulted in private control of entire industries and basic
services capable of affecting a whole area or even a nation. At the same time,
much private property lost its individuality and in effect became socialized.
Multiple ownership of corporations helped to separate personality from prop-
erty, and property from power.18 5 When the corporations began to stop com-
peting, to merge, agree, and make mutual plans, they became private govern-
ments. Finally, they sought the aid and partnership of the state, and thus by
their own volition became part of public government.
These changes led to a movement for reform, which sought to limit arbi-
trary private power and protect the common man. Property rights were con-
sidered more the enemy than the friend of liberty. The reformers argued that
property must be separated from personality. 186 Walton Hamilton wrote:
As late as the turn of the last century justices were not yet distinguish-
ing between liberty and property; in 'the universes beneath their hats
liberty was still the opportunity to acquire property.
... the property of the Reports is not a proprietary thing; it is rather
a shibboleth in whose name the domain of business enterprises has en-
joyed a limited immunity from the supervision of the state.
184. See generally Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Properly in Law, 86 U. PA.
L. REv. 691 (1938); Hamilton & Till, Property, 12 ENcYc. Soc. SCi. 528 (1934);
FREUND, THE SuPAmz ComRT OF THE UNrrE STATES 31-40 (1961).
185. See generally BERLE & MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORArlON AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); and BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1957).




In the annals of the law property is still a vestigial expression of per-
sonality and owes its current constitutional position to its former asso-
ciation with liberty.1 7
During the first half of the twentieth century, the reformers enacted into law
their conviction that private power was a chief enemy of society and of in-
dividual liberty. Property was subjected to "reasonable" limitations in the
interests of society. The regulatory agencies, federal and state, were born of
the reform. In sustaining these major inroads on private property, the Su-
preme Court rejected the older idea that property and liberty were one, and
wrote a series of classic opinions upholding the power of the people to regulate
and limit private rights.
The struggle between abuse and reform made it easy to forget the basic
importance of individual private property. The defense of private property
was almost entirely a defense of its abuses-an attempt to defend not in-
dividual property but arbitrary private power over other human beings. Since
this defense was cloaked in a defense of private property, it was natural for
the reformers to attack too broadly. Walter Lippmann saw this in 1934:
But the issue between the giant corporation and the public should not
be allowed to obscure the truth that the only dependable foundation of
personal liberty is the economic security of private property.
For we must not expect to find in ordinary men the stuff of martyrs, and
we must, therefore, secure their freedom by their normal motives. There
is no surer way to give men the courage to be free than to insure them
a competence upon which they can rely.188
The reform took away some of the power of the corporations and trans-
ferred it to government. In this transfer there was much good, for power was
made responsive to the majority rather than to the arbitrary and selfish few.
But the reform did not restore the individual to his domain. What the cor-
poration had taken from him, the reform simply handed on to government.
And government carried further the powers formerly exercised by the cor-
poration. Government as an employer, or as a dispenser of wealth, has used
the theory that it was handing out gratuities to claim a managerial power as
great as that which the capitalists claimed. Moreover, the corporations allied
themselves with, or actually took over, part of government's system of power.
Today it is the combined power of government and the corporations that
presses against the individual.
187. Hamilton, Property - According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 877-78 (1932);
see also Hamilton & Till, supra note 184, at 528.
188. LIPnPrANN, THE MErHOD oF FREEnom 101 (1934). See also Philbrick, Changing
Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. Rxv. 691 (1938):
It is not, however, the use of ordinary property, nor the property of ordinary
or "natural" persons that presents today serious problems of adjusting law to new
social conditions. Those problems arise in connection with property for power, and
therefore primarily in, connection, with industrial property.
Id. at 726.
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From the individual's point of view, it is not any particular kind of power,
but all kinds of power, that are to be feared. This is the lesson of the public
interest state. The mere fact that power is derived from the majority does not
necessarily make it less oppressive. Liberty is more than the right to do what
the'majority wants, or to do what is "reasonable." Liberty is the right to defy
the majority, and to do what is unreasonable. The great error of the public
interest state is that it assumes an identity between the public interest and
the interest of the majority.
The reform, then, has not done away with the importance of private prop-
erty. More than ever the individual needs to possess, in whatever form, a
small but sovereign island of his own.
B. Largess and the Public Interest
The fact that the reform tended to make much private wealth subject to
"the public interest" has great significance, but it does not adequately explain
the dependent position of the individual and the weakening of civil liberties
in the public interest state. The reformers intended to enhance the values of
democracy and liberty; their basic concern was the preservation of a free
society. But after they established the primacy of "the public interest," what
meaning was given to that phrase? In particular, what values does it embody
as it has been employed to regulate government largess?
Reduced to simplest terms, "the public interest" has usually meant this:
government largess may be denied or taken away if this will serve some legiti-
mate public policy. The policy may be one directly related to the largess itself,
or it may be some collateral objective of government. A contract may be
denied if this will promote fair labor standards. A television license may be
refused if this will promote the policies of the antitrust laws. Veterans bene-
fits may be taken away to promote loyalty to the United States. A liquor
license may be revoked to promote civil rights. A franchise for a barber's
college may not be given out if it will hurt the local economy, nor a taxi
franchise if it will seriously injure the earning capacity of other tax-s.
Most of these objectives are laudable, and all are within the power of
government. The great difficulty is that they are simplistic. Concentration
on a single policy or value obscures other values that may be at stake. Some
of these competing values are other public policies; for example, the policy
of the best possible television service to the public may compete with obser-
vance of the antitrust laws. The legislature is the natural arbiter of such con-
flicts. But the conflicts may also be more fundamental. In the regulation of
government largess, achievement of specific policy goals may undermine the
independence of the individual. Where such conflicts exist, a simplistic notion
of the public interest may unwittingly destroy some values.
Judges tend to limit their sights to a single issue. In Nadiak v. CAB, 80
an airline pilot was grounded for a variety of reasons, some of them admittedly
trivial. In upholding the action of the Board, the court said:
189. 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962).
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The public-including judges who fly-has a vital interest in air safety.
Responsibility for air safety has been placed in the administrative hands
of those deemed by Congress to have an expert competence. Air safety
was of primary importance in the adjudication of this case. The deter-
mination was that air safety would be promoted by -the certificate revoca-
tion.190
Barsky v. Board of Regents' 9 ' shows how one-sided the public interest
concept may become. New York State suspended a doctor's license because he
committed the crime of contempt of Congress. The Supreme Court, upholding
this, identified the public interest as the state's "broad power to establish and
enforce standards of conduct relative to the health of everyone there,"'91 2 and
the "state's legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional
conduct."' 93 But what about the importance of giving doctors security in their
professions? What about the benefits to the state from having physicians who
are independent of administrative control? Not only were these ignored by
the state and the court; no effort was even made to show how the suspension
promoted the one public policy that was named (high professional standards
for those concerned with public health). As Justice Frankfurter said,
It is one thing to recognize the freedom which the constitution wisely
leaves to the States in regulating the professions. It is quite another
thing, however, to sanction a State's deprivation or partial destruction
of a man's professional life on grounds having no possible relation to
fitness, intellectual or moral, to pursue his profession. 194
In Flemming v. Nestor'"5 the concept of the public interest is distorted
even more. It was given a meaning injurious to the independence of millions
of persons. At stake was the security of the old age Social Security pension
system, together with all the social values which might flow from assuring
old people a stable, dignified, and independent basis of retirement. Yet Con-
gress and the Supreme Court jeopardized all these values to serve a public
policy both trivial and vindictive-the punishment of a few persons for Com-
munist Party membership now long past.
The public interest has also failed to take account of the more specific values
of the Bill of Rights. In a case where a radio operator was denied a license
for pleading the fifth amendment, the court said:
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects a person who invokes it from
self-accusation; but when he seeks a license at the hands of an agency
acting under the standard of the public interest, and information sub-
stantially relevant to that standard is withheld under the privilege, as
may be done, the need for the information and the cooperation of the
applicant with respect to it remains. The agency cannot be required to
act without the information.196
190. Id. at 595.
191. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
192. Id. at 449.
193. Id. at 451.
194. Id. at 470 (dissenting opinion).
195. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
196. Blumenthal v. FCC, 318 F.2d 276, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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Referring to a law that requires a motorist to submit to a drunkenness test,
waiving his state privilege against self-incrimination, or lose his driver's
license, the New York Supreme Court said:
Bearing in mind the purpose of the statute and that highway safety is a
matter of great concern to the public, it may not be held that it is un-
reasonable or beyond legislative power to put such a choice to a motorist
who is accused upon reasonable grounds of driving while intoxicated. 107
Another court concluded that a radio operator's freedom of political associa-
tion could be restricted by FCC action in these words:
Borrow says his First Amendment Rights are being infringed. We cannot
agree .... The public interest must be served. He desires to operate a
facility which in the public interest is necessarily licensed by the Govern-
ment. He has affirmative standards to meet in order to secure a license,
just as do doctors, lawyers, barbers, and lenders of money.198
One of the most striking instances of public interest definition in the area
of constitutional rights is Konigsberg v. State Bar.1 9 Konigsberg refused to
tell the state bar examiners whether he was or ever had been a member of the
Communist Party, arguing that such questions infringed his constitutional
rights of free thought, association and expression. Despite substantial evidence
of his good character, none of which was rebutted, and despite his uncon-
tradicted statement that he did not believe in violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, and did not belong to any organization advocating violent overthrow,
Konigsberg was refused admission to the bar. The U.S. Supreme Court up-
held the refusal. Acknowledging that the questions did involve some deter-
rence of free speech, the Court said that its decision must depend upon "an
appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved." 20° It then reached
this conclusion:
[W]e regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to
the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions,
but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to out-
weigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory
disclosure in the circumstances here presented.20 1
In none of these cases did the courts attempt to assign any weight to the
value of unfettered exercise of constitutional rights. Nor did the courts con-
sider what effect their decisions might have on the constitutional rights of
motorists, radio operators, businessmen or lawyers generally. Each case was
treated as if it existed in isolation-as if each individual's case concerned him
alone.
This fundamental fallacy-treating the "individual interest" as affecting
only the party to the case-runs through many of the public interest decisions
197. Schutt v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 43, 48 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
198. Borrow v. FCC, 285 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
199. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
200. Id. at 51.
201. Id. at 52.
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concerning largess. In a case where the Securities and Exchange Commission
suspended a broker-dealer for an alleged violation-without a hearing-the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia "balanced" the interests in-
volved as follows: "protection of the securities-purchasing public" against the
individual's "interest in continuing to issue public offerings of securities."' 2
The court found the "public's interest" to be the weightier. In deciding whether
to revoke a broker-dealer registration for misconduct, another court remarked:
"The balancing of private detriment against public harm requires the fair and
proper exercise by the Commission of its discretionary powers. ' 20 3 In up-
holding the suspension of a driver's license without a hearing, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit said:
We have no doubt that these provisions of law are reasonable regulations
in the interest of safeguarding lives and property from highway accidents.
The incidental hardship upon an individual motorist, in having his license
suspended pending investigation and review, must be borne in deference
to the greater public interest served by the statutory restriction.
2 4
If this is the method of balancing, the result is a foregone conclusion:
We conclude that . . . insofar as the circumstances imposed hardship
upon the individual, the exigencies of government in the public interest
under current conditions must prevail, as they always must where a
similar clash arises.205
It is not the reformers who must bear the blame for the harmful conse-
quences of the public interest state, but those who are responsible for giving
"the public interest" its present meaning. If "the public interest" distorts the
reformers' high purposes, this is so because the concept has been so gravely
misstated. Government largess, like all wealth, must necessarily be regulated
in the public interest. But regulation must take account of the dangers of
dependence, and the need for a property base for civil liberties. Rightly con-
ceived, the public interest is no justification for the erosion of freedom that
has resulted from the present system of government largess. 206
202. R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
203. Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.Zd 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1961) (emphasis
supplied).
204. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 883 (1st Cir. 1953). See also Gnecchi v. State, 58
Wash. 2d 467, 364 P.2d 225 (1961), where a dissenting judge said: "I cannot conceive
of a situation, where there is a necessity to suspend a license without a hearing if the
suspension imposed is for no more than sixty days. What happens to the safety of the
public after sixty days? The purpose of such 'suspension is primarily punishment, and
there is no reason why a hearing should not precede the suspension."' Id. at 477, 364
P.2d at 232.
205. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
206. See generally GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS
105-57 (1956) (Chapter III, "The Right to Make a Living"). Although it speaks in
different terms, and is limited to occupational licensing Professor Gellhorn's discussion
is a most perceptive analysis of the meaning of "the public interest." See also ScHUBRT,
THE PuBLIc INTEREST (1960) for an elaborate analysis of differing public interest
theories.
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V. TowARD INDIVIDUAL STAKES IN THE COMMONWEALTH
Ahead there stretches-to the farthest horizon-the joyless landscape of
the public interest state. The life it promises will be comfortable and com-
forting. It will be well planned-with suitable areas for work and play. But
there will be no precincts sacred to the spirit of individual man.
There can be no retreat from the public interest state. It is the inevitable
outgrowth of an interdependent world. An effort to return to an earlier eco-
nomic order would merely transfer power to giant private governments which
would rule not in the public interest, but in their own interest. If individualism
and pluralism are to be preserved, this must be done not by marching back-
wards, but by building these values into today's society. If public and private
are now -blurred, it will be necessary to draw a iiew zone of privacy. If private
property can no longer perform its protective functions, it will be necessary
to establish institutions to carry on the work that private property once did
but can no longer do.
In these efforts government largess must play a major role. As we move
toward a welfare state, largess will be an ever more important form of wealth.
And largess is a vital link in the relationship between the government and
private sides of society. It is necessary, then, that largess begin to do the
work of property.
The chief obstacle to the creation of private rights in largess has been the fact
that it is originally public property, comes from the state, and may be withheld
completely. But this need not be an obstacle. Traditional property also comes
from the state, and in much the same way. Land, for example, traces back to
grants from the sovereign. In the United States, some was the gift of the King
of England, some that of the King of Spain. The sovereign extinguished In-
dian title by conquest, became the new owner, and then granted title to a
private individual or group.20 7 Some land was the gift of the sovereign under
laws such as the Homestead and Preemption Acts.208 Many other natural
resources-water, minerals and timber, .passed into private ownership under
similar grants. In America, land and resources all were originally government
largess. In a less obvious sense, personal property also stems from govern-
ment. Personal property. is created by law; it owes its origin and continuance
to laws supported by the people as a whole. These laws "give" the property
to one who performs certain actions. Even the man who catches a wild animal
"owns" the animal only as a gift from the sovereign, having fulfilled the
terms 6f an offer to transfer ownership.2 9
Like largess, real and personal property were also originally dispensed on
conditions, and were subject to forfeiture if the conditions failed. The con-
ditions in the sovereign grants, such as colonization, were generally made
explicit, and so was the forfeiture resulting from failure to fulfill them. In
the case of the Preemption and Homestead Acts, there were also specific con-
207. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat:) 543 (1823).
208. 5 Stat 453, 455 (Sept. 4, 1841), 12 Stat. 392 (May 20, 1862).
209. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. R. 175 (1805).
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ditions.210 Even now land is subject to forfeiture for neglect; if it is unused
it may be deemed abandoned to the state or forfeited to an adverse possessor.
In a very similar way, personal property may be forfeited by abandonment or
loss. 2 1 1 Hence, all property might be described as government largess, given
on condition and subject to loss.
If all property is government largess, why is it not regulated to the same
degree as present-day largess? Regulation of property has been limited, not
because society had no interest in property, but because it was in the interest
of society that property be free. Once property is seen not as a natural right
but as a construction designed to serve certain functions, then its origin ceases
to be decisive in determining how much regulation should be imposed. The
conditions that can be attached to receipt, ownership, and use depend not on
where property came from, but on what job it should be expected to per-
form. Thus in the case of government largess, nothing turns on the fact that
it originated in government. The real issue is how it functions and how it
should function.
To create an institution, or to make an existing institution function in a
new way, is an undertaking far too ambitious for the present article. But
it is possible to begin a search for guiding principles. Such principles must
grow out of what we know about how government largess has functioned up
to the present time. And -while principles must remain at the level of gen-
erality, it should be kept in mind that not every principle is equally applicable
to all forms of largess. Our primary focus must be those forms of largess
which chiefly control the rights and status of the individual.
A. Constitutional Limits
The most clearly defined problem posed by government largess is the way
it can be used to apply pressure against the exercise of constitutional rights.
A first principle should be that government must have no power to "buy up"
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.2 1 2 It should not be able to impose any
condition on largess that would be invalid if imposed on something other than
a "gratuity." 213 Thus, for example, government should not be able to deny
largess because of invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.2 14
210. The Homestead Act had conditions of age, citizenship, intention to settle was
cultivated, and loyalty to the United States. 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
211. Mullett v. Bradley, 24 Misc. 695, 53 N.Y. Supp. 781 (1898) ; Bridges v. Hawkes-
worth, 21 L.J. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1851).
212. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 1595, 1599 (1960).
213. Compare Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes,
71 YALE L.J. 1191 (1962). In the context of legislation dealing with government obliga-
tions, Professor Calabresi argues that certain regulation carn only be justified by a "para-
mount power of government" (e.g., the commerce power) rather tlhn power incidental
to the obligation itself.
214. Judge Curtis Bok wrote:
We are unwilling to engraft upon our law the notion, nowhere so decided, that
unemployment bhnefits may'be denied because'of raiing ieh bar 'of the [)Fifth]
Amendment against rumor or report ofdiil6yalty o bequse of refusing to answer
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This principle is in a sense a revival of the old but neglected rule against
unconstitutional conditions, as enunciated 'by the Supreme Court:
Broadly stated, the rule is that the right to continue the exercise of a
privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee's
submission to a condition prescribed by the -state which is hostile to the
provisions of the federal constitution.2 15
If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as .
condition of its favor, it may in like manner, compel a surrender of all.
It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.216
The courts in recent times have gone part of the distance toward this prin-
ciple. In 1958 the Supreme Court held that California could not use the
gratuity theory to deny a tax exemption to persons engaged in certain
political activities:
To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech
is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the
same is if the state were to fine them for this speech. The appellees are
plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption is a
"privilege" or a "bounty," its denial may not infringe speech.217
In 1963 the Court followed this reasoning in the important case of Sherbert
v. Verner.21s South Carolina provided unemployment compensation, but re-
quired recipients to accept suitable employment when it became available, or
lose their benefits. An unemployed woman was offered a job requiring her to
work Saturdays, but she refused it because she was a Seventh Day Adventist,
to whom Saturday was the Sabbath-a day when work was forbidden. The
state thereafter refused to pay her any unemployment benefits. The Supreme
Court reversed this action:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appel-
lant for her Saturday worship.
Nor may the South Carolina Court's construction of the statute be
saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment
compensation benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege."
It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and ex-
pression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon
such rumor or report. The possible abuses of such a doctrine are shocking to
imagine....
Ault Unemployment Compensation Case, 398 Pa. 250, 259, 157 A.2d 375, 380 (1960).
215. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931).
216. Frost & Frost Co. v. Railroad Comm'nr 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926); Note, Un-
constitutional Conditions, 73 HAxv. L. Rsv. 1595 (1960); Hale, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLum. L. Rav. 321 (1935). The latter is an
elaborate study of the older cases orn the Federal conditioning power.
217. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
218. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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a benefit or privilege .... [To] condition the availability of benefits upon
this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious
faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. 2 19
In a somewhat different setting, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reached an analogous result. The Civil Aeronautics Board attempted to issue
a letter of registration to an irregular carrier in terms making the registration
subject to suspension without a hearing. The agency claimed that, since it
was granting the carrier an exemption from statutory requirements, a form
of gratuity, it could provide that suspension might be without a hearing. The
court said:
The government cannot make a business dependent upon a permit and
make an otherwise unconstitutional requirement a condition to the per-
mit.22 0
On the state level there have been some rather similar decisions. 221
The problem becomes more complicated when a court attempts, as current
doctrine seems to require, to "balance" the deterrence of a constitutional right
against some opposing interest. In any balancing process, no weight should
be given to the contention that what is at stake is a mere gratuity. It should
be recognized that pressure against constitutional rights from denial of a
"gratuity" may be as great or greater than pressure from criminal punish-
ment. And the concept of the public interest should be given a meaning
broad enough to include general injury to independence and constitutional
rights. 222 It is not possible to consider detailed problems here. It is enough to
219. Id. at 404-06.
220. Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18,20 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
221. In California a political test for use of school auditoriums for holding public
meetings was upset:
Nor can it [the State] make the privilege of holding them dependent on conditions
that would deprive any members of the public of their constitutional rights. A
state is without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition
for granting a privilege even though the privilege is the use of state property.
Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545-46, 171 P2d 885 (1946);
ACLU v. Board of Educ., 55 Cal. 2d 167, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 45 (1961). See
also Syrek v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2 Cal. Rptr. 40, 47 (Ct. App.
1960), aff'd, 54 Cal. 2d 519, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1960).
222. The approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Parker v. Lester,
227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955) might serve as a model:
What we must balance in the scales here does not involve a choice between any
security screening program and the protection of individual seamen. Rather we
must weigh against the rights of the individual to the traditional opportunity for
notice and hearing, the public need for a screening system which denies such right
to notice and hearing. Granted -that the Government may adopt appropriate means
for excluding security risks from employment on merchant vessels, what is the
factor of public interest and necessity which requires that it be done in the manner
here adopted?
Id. at 718.
Later the Court added:
It is not a simple case of sacrificing the interests of a few to the welfare of the
many. In weighing the considerations of which we are mindful here, we must
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say that government should gain no power, as against constitutional limita-
tions, by reason of its role as a dispenser of wealth.
B. "Substantive Limits
Beyond the limits deriving from the Constitution, what limits should be
imposed on governmental power over largess? Such limits, whatever they may
be, must be largely self-imposed and self-policed by legislatures; the Consti-
tution sets only a bare minimum of limitations on legislative policy. The first
type of limit should be on relevance. It has proven possible to argue that
practically anything in the way of regulation is relevant to some legitimate
legislative purpose. But this does not mean that it is desirable for legislatures
to make such use of their powers. As Justice Douglas said in the Barsky
case:
So far as I know, nothing in a man's political beliefs disables him from
setting broken bones or removing ruptured appendixes, safely and effi-
ciently. A practicing surgeon is unlikely to uncover many state secrets in
the course of his professional activities. 22
Courts sometimes manage, by statutory construction, to place limits on
relevance. One example is the judicial reaction to attempts to ban "disloyal
tenants" from government aided housing projects. The Illinois Court said:
The purpose of the Illinois Housing Authorities Act is to eradicate slums
and provide housing for persons of low-income class. . . . It is evident
that the exclusion of otherwise qualified persons solely because of mem-
bership in organizations designated as subversive by the Attorney Gen-
eral has no tendency whatever to further such purpose.... A construction
of section 27 which would enable the housing authority to prescribe con-
ditions of eligibility having no rational connection with the purpose of the
act would raise serious constitutional questions.22
And the Wisconsin Court said:
Counsel for the defendant Authority have failed to point out to this court
how the occupation of any units of a federally aided housing project by
tenants who may be members of a subversive organization threatens the
successful operation of such housing projects.2 5
It is impossible to confine the concept of relevance. But legislatures should
strive for a meaningful, judicious concept of relevance if regulation of largess
is not to become a handle for regulating everything else.
Besides relevance, a second important limit on substantive power might be
concerned with discretion. To the extent possible, delegated power to make
recognize that if these regulations may be sustained, similar regulations may be
made effective in respect to other groups as to whom Congress may next choose
to express its legislative fears.
Id. at 721.
223. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472, 474 (1954) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
224. Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 326, 122 N.E2d 522,
526 (1954). See also Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215
(Super. Ct. 1955).
225. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 287, 70 N.W.2d 605, 615 (1955).
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rules ought to be confined within ascertainable limits, and regulating agencies
should not be assigned the task of enforcing conflicting policies. Also, agencies
should be enjoined to use their powers only for the purposes for which they
were designed.226 In a perhaps naive attempt to accomplish this, Senator
Lausche introduced a bill to prohibit United States government contracting
officers from using their contracting authority for purposes of duress. This
bill in its own words, would prohibit officials from denying contracts, or the
right to bid on contracts, with the intent of forcing the would-be contractor
to perform or refrain from performing any act which such person had no legal
obligation to perform or not perform.227 Although this bill might not be a
very effective piece of legislation, it does suggest a desirable objective.
A final limit on substantive power, one that should be of growing impor-
tance, might be a principle that policy making authority ought not to be dele-
gated to essentially private organizations. The increasing practice of giving
professional associations and occupational organizations authority in areas of
government largess tends to make an individual subject to a guild of his fel-
lows. A guild system, when attached to government largess, adds to the feudal
characteristics of the system.
C. Procedural Safeguards
Because it is so hard to confine relevance and discretion, procedure offers
a valuable means for restraining arbitrary action. This was recognized in the
strong procedural emphasis of the Bill of Rights, and it is being recognized in
the increasingly procedural emphasis of administrative law. The law of gov-
ernment largess has developed with little regard for procedure. Reversal of
this trend is long overdue.
The grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of government
largess should be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures. Action
should be open to hearing and contest, and based upon a record subject to
judicial review. The denial of any form of privilege or benefit on the basis of
undisclosed reasons should no longer be tolerated. 228 Nor should the same
226. Compare Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 889, 279 P.2d 215,
218 (1955):
[W]e fail to find in the act, pursuant to which the plaintiff Housing Authority
was created, anything to suggest that it is authorized to use the powers conferred
upon it to punish subversives or discourage persons from entertaining subversive
ideas by denying to such the right of occupying its facilities....
227. 109 CoNG. REc. 3258-59 (daily ed., March 4, 1963). The Senator, while de-
nouncing coercion and government by men, rather than laws, failed to discuss the question,
whether there is any "right" to a government contract.
228. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended "drastic
changes" in the procedures by which persons or firms may be debarred from government
contracting. The Conference said that such action should not be taken without prior
notice, which includes a statement of reasons, and a trial-type hearing before an im-
partial trier of facts, all within a framework of procedures. Thus, protections would sur-
round even that form of largess which is closest to being a matter within the managerial
function, of government. FiNAL RE'ORr OF THE ADmNS TRATiVE CONFENCE OF THE
UNrrED STATES, p. 15 and Recommendation 'No. 29' (1962).
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person sit as legislator, prosecutor, judge and jury, combining all the func-
tions of government in such a way as to make fairness virtually impossible.
There is no justification for the survival of arbitrary methods where valuable
rights are at stake.
Even higher standards of procedural fairness should apply when govern-
ment action has all the effects of a penal sanction. In Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,229 where the postmaster general re-
voked the second-class mail privileges of a newspaper because he found its
contents in violation of the Espionage Act, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a far-
seeing dissent on the penal nature of such a denial of government benefits:
.. It would in practice deprive many publishers of their property with-
out due process of law. Would it not also violate the Fifth Amendment?
It would in practice subject publishers to punishment without a hearing
by any court. Would it not also violate Article III of the Constitution?
It would in practice subject publishers to severe punishment without trial
by jury. Would it not also violate the Sixth Amendment? And the
punishment inflicted-denial of a civil right-is certainly unusual. Would
it also violate the Eighth Amendment?
The actual and intended effect of the order was merely to impose a very
heavy fine, possibly $150 a day for supposed transgression in the past.
But the trial and punishment of crimes is a function which the Consti-
tution, Article III, § 2, cl. 3, entrusts to the judiciary....
What is in effect a very heavy fine has been imposed by the Postmaster
General. It has been imposed because he finds that the publisher has com-
mitted the crime of violating the Espionage Act. And that finding is
based in part upon "representations and complaints from sundry good
and loyal citizens" with whom the publisher was not confronted. It may
be that the court would hold, in view of Article Six in our Bill of Rights,
that Congress is without power to confer upon the Postmaster General,
or even upon a court, except upon the verdict of a jury and upon con-
fronting the accused with the witnesses against him, authority to inflict
indirectly such a substantial punishment as this.31
Today many administrative agencies take action which is penal in all but
name. The penal nature of these actions should be recognized by appropriate
procedures.m1
Even if no sanction is involved, the proceedings associated with govern-
ment largess must not be used to undertake adjudications of facts that nor-
mally should be made by a court after a trial. Assuming it is relevant to the
229. United States ex tel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921).
230. Id. at 434-35 (dissenting opinion).
231. Recently the Supreme Court, in a case involving revocation of citizenship for
evading the draft, held that any action, that is in fact punishment cannot be taken "with-
out a prior criminal trial and all its incidents, including indictment, notice, confrontation,
jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses." Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963).
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grant of a license or benefit to know whether an individual has been guilty of
a crime or other violation of law, should violations be determined by the
agency? The consequence is an adjudication of guilt without benefit of con-
stitutional criminal proceedings with judge, jury, and the safeguards of the
Bill of Rights. In our society it is impossible to "try" a violation of law for
any purpose without "trying" the whole person of the alleged violator. The
very adjudication is punishment, even if no consequences are attached. It may
be added that an agency should not find "guilt" after a court has found in-
nocence. The spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional ban against double
jeopardy should prevent an agency from subjecting anyone to a second trial
for the same offense.
D. From Largess to Right
The proposals discussed above, however salutary, are by themselves far
from adequate to assure the status of individual man with respect to largess.
The problems go deeper. First, the growth of government power based on
the dispensing of wealth must be kept within bounds. Second, there must be
a zone of privacy for each individual beyond which neither government nor
private power can push-a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of
regulation and control. Finally, it must be recognized that we are becoming
a society based upon relationship and status-status deriving primarily from
source of livelihood. Status is so closely linked to personality that destruction
of one may well destroy the other. Status must therefore be surrounded with
the kind of safeguards once reserved for personality.
Eventually those forms of largess which are closely linked to status must
be deemed to be held as of right. Like property, such largess could be gov-
erned by a system of regulation plus civil or criminal sanctions, rather than
a system based upon denial, suspension and revocation. As things now stand,
violations lead to forfeitures-outright confiscation of wealth and status. But
there is surely no need for these drastic results. Confiscation,- if used at all,
should be the ultimate, not the most common and convenient penalty. The
presumption should be that the professional man will keep his license, and the
welfare recipient his pension. These interests should be "vested." If revocation
is necessary, not by reason of the fault of the individual holder, but by reason
of overriding demands of public policy, perhaps payment of just compensation
would be appropriate. The individual should not bear the entire loss for a
remedy primarily intended to benefit the community.
The concept of right is most urgently needed with respect to benefits like
unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old age insurance. These
benefits are based upon a recognition that misfortune and deprivation are
often caused by forces far beyond the control of the individual, such as tech-
nological change, variations in demand for goods, depressions, or wars. The
aim of these benefits is to preserve the self-sufficiency of the individual,
to rehabilitate him where necessary, and to allow him to be a valuable mem-
ber of a family and a community; in theory they represent part of the. in-
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dividual's rightful share in the commonwealth. 23 2 Only by making such benefits
into rights can the welfare state achieve its goal of providing a secure minimum
basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society where each man cannot
be wholly the master of his own destiny.233
CONCLUSION
The highly organized, scientifically planned society of the future, governed
for the good of its inhabitants, promises the best life that men have ever
known. In place of the misery and injustice of the past there can be prosperity,
leisure, knowledge, and rich opportunity open to all. In the rush of accomplish-
ment, however, not all values receive equal attention; some are temporarily
forgotten while others are pushed ahead. We have made provision for nearly
everything, but we have made no adequate provision for individual man.
This article is an attempt to offer perspective on the transformation of
society as it bears on the economic basis of individualism. The effort has been
to show relationships; to bring together drivers' licenses, unemployment in-
surance, membership in the bar, permits for using school auditoriums, and
second class mail privileges, in order to see what we are becoming.
Government largess is only one small corner of a far vaster problem. There
are many other new forms of wealth: franchises in private businesses, equities
in corporations, the right to receive privately furnished utilities and services,
status in private organizations. These too may need added safeguards in the
future. Similarly, there are many sources of expanded governmental power
aside from largess. By themselves, proposals concerning government largess
232. The phrase is adapted from Hamilton and Till's definition of the word "prop-
erty": "a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the common-
wealth." Hamilton & Till, Property, 12 ExcYc. Soc. Sci.
233. Experts in the field of social welfare have often argued that benefits should rest
on a more secure basis, and that individuals in need should be deemed "entitled" to bent-
fits. See Ten Broek & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative
Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 237 (1954); KIETa-LucAs, DEcIsIoNs ABOUT PEOPLE
IN NEm (1957). The latter author speaks of a "right to assistance" which is a corollary
of the "right to self-determination' (id. at 251) and urges public assistance workers to
pledge to respect the rights and dignity of welfare clients (id. at 263). See also WYNN,
FATHERLEss FAMUIEs 78-83, 162-63 (1964). The author proposes a "fatherless child
allowance," to which every fatherless child would be entitled.
Starting from a quite different frame of reference-the problem of the rule of law in
the welfare state-Professor Harry Jones has similarly argued that the welfare state
must be regarded as a source of new rights, and that such rights as Social Security must
be surrounded by substantial and procedural safeguards comparable to those enjoyed by
traditional rights of property. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 143, 154-55 (1958). See also Note, Charity Versus Social Insurance In Unem-
ployment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357 (1963).
A group called the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution recently urged that,
in view of the conditions created by the "cybernation revolution?' in the United States,
every American should be guaranteed an adequate inconie as a matter of right whether
or not he works. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1964, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
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would be far from accomplishing any fundamental reforms. But, somehow, we
must begin.
At the very least, it is time to reconsider the theories under which new
forms of wealth are regulated, and by which governmental power over them
is measured. It is time to recognize that "the public interest" is all too often
a reassuring platitude that covers up sharp clashes of conflicting values, and
hides fundamental choices. It is time to see that the "privilege" or "gratuity"
concept, as applied to wealth dispensed by government, is not much different
from the absolute right of ownership that private capital once invoked to
justify arbitrary power over employees and the public.
Above all, the time has come for us to remember what the framers of the
Constitution knew so well-that "a power over a man's subsistence amounts
to a power over his will." We cannot safely entrust our livelihoods and our
rights to the discretion of authorities, examiners, boards of control, character
committees, regents, or license commissioners. We cannot permit any official
or agency to pretend to sole knowledge of the public good. We cannot put
the independence of any man-least of all our Barskys and our Anastaplos-
wholly in the power of other men.
If the individual is to survive in a collective society, he must have protec-
tion against its ruthless pressures. There must be sanctuaries or enclaves
where no majority can reach. To shelter the solitary human spirit does not
merely make possible the fulfillment of individuals; it also gives society the
power to change, to grow, and to regenerate, and hence to endure. These were
the objects which property sought to achieve, and can no longer achieve. The
challenge of the future will be to construct, for the society that is coming,
institutions and laws to carry on this work. Just as the Homestead Act was
a deliberate effort to foster individual values at an earlier time, so we must
try to build an economic basis for liberty today-a Homestead Act for rootless
twentieth century man. We must create a new property.
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